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WEBSITE DESIGN AND LIABILITY
Nancy S. Kim*
ABSTRACT: Two regrettable behaviors have emerged online: the posting of content
about others without their consent; and impulsive postings with no consideration of
long-term consequences. Website operators can either encourage or discourage these
regrettable behaviors and influence their consequences through the design of their
website and by the fostering of norms and codes of conduct. Unfortunately, courts
interpret section 230 of the Communications Decency Act as providing websites with
broad immunity. In an earlier article, I argued that a proprietorship standard should be
imposed upon websites, which would require them to take reasonable measures to
prevent foreseeable harm. This article further champions the concept of website propri-
etorship liability and proposes that section 230 should be amended to recognize such
liability with provisions for the following "safe harbors" for website operators that: (1)
permit only postings by identified posters; (2) have nonprofit status and do not accept
ad revenue; and (3) remove postings upon request of the victim. This article also ad-
dresses anticipated objections that are based upon market concerns and free speech
concerns.
CITATION: Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 Jurimetrics J. 383-431
(2012).
This article argues for a comprehensive proposal to amend section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which is the controversial legisla-
tion that protects online intermediaries from civil liability for content posted
by third parties.' Many credit this provision of the CDA with fostering Internet
growth and the proliferation of sites where ordinary citizens may express their
views. 2 Others, however, alarmed by the unlawful nature of some online corn-
*Professor, California Western School of Law. An early version of many of the arguments
raised in this paper was discussed at the 47 U.S.C. section 230: A 15-Year Retrospective, Santa
Clara Law School, Santa Clara, CA, March 4, 2011. The author gratefully acknowledges the many
helpful comments from the participants at that conference that informed this paper. Special thanks
are owed to Peter Swire for helping to better analyze and reframe this project at an early stage, and
to Jacqui Lipton and Eric Goldman for reviewing a draft of this article and providing much appre-
ciated feedback.
1. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
2. Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How
Zeran v. America Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 583
(2008) (concluding that section 230 has "truly fostered the last ten years' development of the
web."). An online forum on the topic of cyber harassment on a popular legal blog garnered many
heated comments about the pros and cons of limiting speech online. See Responses to Danielle
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munication, have called for legal reform. 3 While the right to free expression
applies to Internet discourse, the parameters of that right have not been clearly
established. The unique characteristics of online discourse complicate the
analysis. One of the achievements of the Internet is that it enables ordinary
people to share their views with countless others. Regulations that require
prescreening or content moderation may impose too great a burden on web-
sites that may have millions of daily visitors. The popular online bulletin board
Craigslist, for example, claims to have over twenty billion page views per
month.4 On the other hand, the very popularity of certain websites means that
defamatory or personally intrusive content is viewed by more people, ampli-
fying the harm. The large volume of postings and the ability to remain anony-
mous may lead some posters to believe they are hidden in the crowd, causing
them to act out in offensive or unlawful ways.
Two regrettable online behaviors have emerged within the last decade.
The first is the posting of images or information about others without their
consent or approval, which are referred to in this article as "third-party post-
ings." The other is the impulsive posting of images or information (about one-
self or others) without consideration of context or long-term implications,
which for the sake of convenience is referred to as "impulsive posting." The
very characteristics of Internet communication that make it appealing (that is,
ease of publication and widespread dissemination) also make it unpredictable
and potentially harmful given its other characteristics of permanence and irre-
trievability. 5 This is not to say that these two behaviors-impulsive posting
and third-party posting-are regrettable in every instance. One might argue
that impulsive postings, such as tweets,6 can spur dynamic conversations and
facilitate important communications and observations. In some cases, third-
party posting may be useful as a means of alerting others to harmful or un-
lawful conduct. But these two behaviors may have negative long-term social
consequences, too, such as the stifling of expression.
Citron, One Month in Jail: The Sentence in the Ravi Case, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 21,
2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.concuningopinions.com/archives/2012/05/one-month-in-jail-the-sent
ence-in-the-ravi-case.html.
3. Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET, 155, 156 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (noting that the effect of
section 230 has been "to treat cyber-cesspools wholly differently from, for example, newspapers
that decide to publish similar material."); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 61, 114-25 (2009) (opposing blanket immunity for website operators); Daniel J. Solove,
Speech, Privacy and Reputation on the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 15, 23-27 (Saul
Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (arguing for reformation of section 230).
4. Factsheet, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/aboutfactsheet (last updated Mar. 12,
2012).
5. See Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, (Magazine), at 30
(describing the "collective identity crisis" created by the impossibility of completely erasing one's
digital past).
6. A tweet is a post on the popular microblogging site, Twitter. See About Twitter, TWITTER
https://twitter.com/about (last visited July 31, 2012).
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Online speech is a double-edged sword when it comes to expression be-
cause enabling one person to post may mean another person is forced to sup-
press herself.7 Let us assume that someone named Jane regularly posts photos
from parties that she has attended to her Facebook account. At subsequent
parties, other guests may refrain from drinking or dancing, to protect their
reputation. Jane's posting activities stifle the enjoyment and expressive activ-
ity of other guests. 8
The free speech versus privacy debate goes to the very heart of what the
First Amendment was intended to protect: expression and autonomy.9 The
freedom to live one's life according to one's own beliefs is central to Amer-
ican society. A critical part of enjoying this freedom is the ability to explore
and question existing beliefs and ideas and to try out different identities at
different stages of one's life. Yet it is this very freedom-to explore new iden-
7. The nastiness of online comments may also have a silencing effect on more civilized
participants. See Taffy Brodesser-Akner, E Playgrounds Can Get Vicious, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2010, E8 (discussing the "torrent of anonymous maliciousness" and the effect it has on a writer).
8. For a discussion of the complicated issues arising from privacy, autonomy and the power
of technology to create new concerns, see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE
L.J. 421 (1980). Gavison writes that the
identification of technological developments as a major source of new concern may be supported by
the fact that modern claims concerning the secrecy and anonymity aspects of privacy have not been
accompanied by new claims concerning physical access: technological advances have affected the
acquisition, storage, and dissemination of information, but gaining physical access is a process that
has not changed much. On the other hand, the increase in the number of people whose profession it
is to observe and report, the intensified activity in search of publishable information, and the
changes in the equipment that enables such enterprises, make it more likely that events and infor-
mation will in fact be recorded and published.
Id. at 466. See also Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641 (1995) (discussing
the issues raised in cyberspace, particularly with respect to the First Amendment, anonymity,
autonomy and accountability); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First
Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1004
(2000) ("Doctrinal analysis often requires us to reconcile traditional legal principle with modem
technological innovation. Nowhere is this task of reconciliation more daunting than with cyber-
space, where the speed and spread of information has been ratcheted up to levels that were unim-
aginable even a generation ago. And nowhere in cyberspace is it more important to tweak doctrine
than on the general legal issue of privacy, which is here defined as the ability of individuals to
keep private ... information about themselves that could provide harmful or embarrassing to them
if made public or placed in the wrong hands."). James Grimmelman has discussed the unintended
consequences and privacy violations that occur from information posted on Facebook. See
generally James Grimnelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1137 (2009) (explaining how
Facebook users socialize on the site and misunderstand the risks involved); James Grimmelmann,
Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L.J. 793 (2010) (providing examples of how information
posted on Facebook can be misused).
9. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 929 (3d ed.
2006) (noting that a "major rationale often expressed for protecting freedom of speech as a fun-
damental right is that it is an essential aspect of personhood and autonomy."). While I focus on
personal expression here, it also refers to political expression. Sean Scott observes, "The conflict
that arises between the right of privacy and the First Amendment freedom of the press may not be
one of individual versus society." Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy,
71 WASH. L. REv. 683, 687 (1996). "The private facts tort does protect an individual's interest in
personhood or human dignity, it also promotes some of the same values protected by the First
Amendment." Id.
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tities and viewpoints and to take risks-that is threatened by the two regret-
table behaviors. 10 As Anupam Chander writes, many adolescents will respond
to the Internet's threat to privacy by "modifying either their private behavior-
risking youthfulness-or their public behavior-avoiding positions that might
lead to embarrassing disclosures.""
The Internet has given ordinary individuals the power to harass and de-
stroy the lives of other ordinary individuals and so threatens to fundamentally
change the nature of our society. The rhetoric of freedom (especially of
speech) is often used by those who choose to defend bullying and unethical
behavior, but in a free society, one should be permitted to express oneself in an
intimate setting without fear of being harassed, spied upon, or subjected to
blackmail. As Anne Branscomb wrote, autonomy or control over one's per-
sonal information is the "flip side of freedom of speech": "This freedom not to
speak simply protects the fight not to have information disclosed without con-
sent or in a manner that may be contrary to one's interests."' 2 Unfortunately,
as stories proliferate about vengeful ex-partners and perverted stealth shutter-
bugs, some may react by tamping their naturally expressive selves, even in
places and spaces that would typically be considered private. Without knowing
whether a potential lover or roommate today may be a vindictive online poster
tomorrow, some may keep themselves fully clothed and sexually inhibited
even behind closed doors, in rooms darkened to foil imagined hidden cameras.
A paranoid fantasy, perhaps. But one created by our culture.' 3 Time, too, plays
an important role, shifting and often betraying with its passage. A poster may
appreciate the swiftness with which her views are disseminated online, but
may regret her impulsivity later when her attitude or views change. 14 A teen-
10. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423-35 (2000) (discussing need for autonomy-based approach to data
privacy protection); Jacqueline D. Lipton, "We the Paparazzi": Developing a Privacy Paradigm
for Digital Video, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 919, 982-84 (2009) [hereinafter Lipton, We the Paparazzi]
(citation omitted) (noting that "the exponential rise of online privacy-destroying technologies has
led to increasing concerns about individual privacy in recent years" and that "it is time to consider
a new multimodal regulatory approach to protect individual privacy.").
11. Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET
127 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2011). See also Lizette Alvarez, Spring Break
Gets Tamer with World Watching Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, at A1O (reporting that
college students on spring break are becoming more reserved out of fear that their antics may
show up online).
12. Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1644.
13. An article in the New York Times noted the increase in delusions relating to reality
television or the Internet: "With Internet delusion, patients typically incorporate the Internet into
paranoid thoughts, including a fear that the Web is somehow monitoring or controlling their lives,
or being used to transmit photographs or other personal information." Sarah Kershaw, Look
Closely, Doctor: See the Camera?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at G1. While many psychiatrists
believe that these patients would be delusional anyways, "the more radical view is that this pushes
some people over the threshold; the environment tips them over the edge. And if culture can make
people crazy, then we need to look at it." Id. (quoting Dr. Joel Gold, who is a clinical assistant
professor of psychiatry at New York University) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Cautionary tales of online disclosure remorse abound. See, e.g., Emily Gould, Exposed:
What I Gained-and Lost-By Writing About My Intimate Life Online, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008,
(Magazine), at 32.
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ager, for example, may enjoy chronicling her exploits online, but may regret
divulging such secrets when they prevent her from getting a coveted job later 5
or when they embarrass her future children.' 
6
Both behaviors together-impulsive, third-party postings-can be particu-
larly damaging. There are myriad websites that host naked pictures of ex-
lovers, reveal secrets and spread lies. The victim has no redress if the website
operator refuses to remove the harmful posting. The poster is often anony-
mous. Even if posters can be identified, they may be judgment proof and a
lawsuit, even if successful, would only result in more traffic being directed to
the damaging post. 17
15. See Jennifer Preston, Social Medial History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2011, at B I (discussing how information posted on social media sites may impinge a
prospective job applicant's chances of getting hired). Information posted online may also affect an
applicant's prospects of getting into graduate school. Id. In a recent study of 123 top graduate
schools of education, engineering, psychology and public administration conducted by Kaplan
Test prep, 12% of admissions officers revealed that they were permitted to visit applicants' social
networking pages; of those, 29% had rejected an applicant based upon what they discovered.
Jacques Steinberg, The Next Gate, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, at ED9.
16. A recent study by the Pew Research Center's reports that one in ten social media profile
owners say they have posted content to a social networking site that they later regret sharing.
Young adults (15% of profile owners ages 18-29) were considerably more likely to express such
regret than profile owners ages 50 and old (5%). PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
PRIVACY MANAGEMENT ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 11 (2012), available at http://pewinter
net.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIPPrivacymanagement on-social-media-sites_022412.pdf.
Helen Nissenbaum analyzes the importance of context in private information disclosures more
fully. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004).
Nissenbaum argues that contextual integrity should be a benchmark for analyzing privacy
intrusions. Id. at 138. Under Nissenbaum's theory, "a privacy violation has occurred when either
contextual norms of appropriateness or norms of flow have been breached. . . . [P]ersonal
information revealed in a particular context is always tagged with that context and never 'up for
grabs."' Id. at 143. See also Chander, supra note 11, at 124-25 ("The Intemet Age can place a
person's history, or, worse, a fleeting episode from that history, at the world's call. The past might
haunt the twenty-first-century child till the end of her days .... Decisions in such a life require
consideration not only of the reputational consequences via-A-vis families, friends, and acquaint-
ances, but also with respect to future employers, partners, and even unborn children."); Josh
Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: A
Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image Over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 313, 343-44 (2009) (stating that "where an image captured of a person engaging in an
activity may easily be taken out of context, such a chance to explain the photograph is not a possi-
bility, as the subject might not have even been aware he was recorded.").
17. See Nancy S. Kim, Website Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
993, 1008-12 (2009) (outlining the inadequacy of existing legal remedies for online harassment).
See also David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of
Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 261 (2010) (arguing that "defamation law
suffers from significant doctrinal and practical limitations that preclude it from achieving its goal
of protecting reputation."); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 859 (2000) (citations omitted) (noting that defendants in defa-
mation actions may not have deep pockets and may be unable to satisfy a judgment).
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Given the inadequacy of existing legal remedies to address the harm
caused by online postings,' 8 the best strategy is prevention and deterrence.
19
Website operators are in the best position to prevent and deter harmful online
conduct; 20 unfortunately, because they also have broad immunity for content
posted by their users, they may have no incentive to do so.2 1 In this article, the
concept of website proprietorship liability that I proposed in an earlier article
is developed further. 22 Part I briefly summarizes the rationale for website pro-
prietorship liability and discusses the advantages of a reasonableness standard.
18. The scholarly literature on the challenges that user generated content websites create for
privacy law is vast. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip,
RUMOR AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007) (exploring the implications of user-generated
content on the reputation of others); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 477, 494-514 (2010) (examining different aspects of privacy to gain a comprehensive
view of online privacy); Patricia Sdnchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2008) (analyzing the public disclosure tort and its suitability for online
harms). ); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, (examining different aspects of privacy
to gain a comprehensive view of online privacy); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007) (exploring the implications
of user generated content on the reputation of others)
19. As Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, state:
The judiciary's inflated interpretation of § 230 has created a legal environment that is ideal for in-
jury and difficult for redress. ISPs have no obligation to remove tortious materials, to prevent the
reposting of objectionable materials, or to help victims track down the primary wrongdoers....
Consumers have the right to pursue primary wrongdoers through tort litigation, but this is rarely a
realistic option because the typical cybereriminal finds it easy to default by disappearing to an un-
known and unknowable foreign venue.
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 341
(2005).
20. Douglas Lichtman captures the rationale for imposing liability on intermediaries in some
situations. Lichtman states:
The conventional economic account makes clear that private parties cannot create the optimal lia-
bility regime on their own in instances where the party directly responsible for the bad act is beyond
the effective reach of the law, or in instances where transaction costs make contract negotiations
implausible. The conventional account further stresses that liability should be considered in in-
stances where one party has the ability to deter or detect the bad acts of another, and also where lia-
bility can serve to encourage a party to internalize some significant negative externality associated
with its activities.
Douglas Lichtman, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, REGULATION, Winter 2004-
2005, at 54, 56. See also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 19, at 390 (noting that Internet service
providers (ISPs) are "typically in the position of the 'least cost avoider' to prevent future harm to
Internet users."). But cf Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1103, 1117-18 (2011) (noting that "criminal law may be a better option than civil law
for redressing many online wrongs" because it "seeks to punish and deter wrongdoing while civil
law seeks to provide remedies that make a plaintiff whole.").
21. See Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online
Harassment, 32 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 383, 418 (2009) (noting that section 230 provides no
incentive or obligation to remove harassing posts).
22. Kim, supra note 17, at 1034-47. While I previously made a distinction between "pub-
licly accessible" and invitation-only websites that require a password, I have disregarded that
distinction for this article. Id. at 1000-01. The concerns that I had about including invitation-only
websites, such as certain social networking sites, are remedied by the safe harbor provisions that I
propose in Part Ill. Furthermore, given the ease with which content can be copied and pasted from
one site to another, the potential for harm is significant regardless of where the content was ini-
tially posted.
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This Part also analyzes section 230 of the CDA, which is the statute that has
been interpreted by many courts as giving website operators broad immunity
for hosting user content. The blanket treatment of website operators ignores
differences among them and explains how both the underlying policy of the
statute and its plain language support the recognition of proprietorship lia-
bility. Part I also explores the role that terminology plays in muddling the
issues surrounding section 230.
Part II proposes an analysis of reasonableness in the context of website
proprietorship liability that focuses on website design and culture. Part II ex-
plains how website operators can influence user behavior through user inter-
face design and by fostering and encouraging a particular culture. As Jaron
Lanier has observed, "the user interface designs that arise from the ideology of
the computing cloud make people-all of us-less kind., 23 Some website
operators design interfaces to elicit and inflame that unkindness. Both the
design of a website and its culture can exacerbate or mitigate the negative
consequences of the two regrettable behaviors. This article does not argue that
website operators should necessarily discourage either impulsive or third-party
postings. Rather, website operators should examine the ways in which their
website design and culture encourage and influence these behaviors, and they
should respond (and perhaps, reconfigure their sites) accordingly.
Part III introduces the following three "safe harbors" to website proprie-
torship liability: notice and takedown, identified postings, and nonprofit status
with no paid advertising. In essence, a website operator that qualifies for one
of these safe harbors would establish de facto that it had acted reasonably to
prevent foreseeable harm.
Part IV addresses anticipated objections and arguments against my pro-
posal for website proprietorship liability. They are organized into two general
categories. The first is based on market concerns. This category of objection
argues that cyber harassment is the inevitable consequence of technological
and societal changes. To accommodate Internet growth and innovation, this
view proposes that we should relinquish supposedly outdated norms, such as
privacy, and succumb to the changes that the Internet brings. The second type
of argument is based on free speech concerns.
This article concludes that, despite the many legitimate concerns raised by
opponents, the positive benefits of imposing liability along with the proposed
safe harbors far outweigh the negative consequences.
I. WEBSITE PROPRIETORSHIP
LIABILITY AND SECTION 230 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
Websites are not typically viewed as businesses unless they engage in
retail transactions. In an earlier article, I proposed that website operators
should be treated as "proprietors" because they exercise control over their
websites and have the potential to generate revenue from the operation of their
23. JARON LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET 61 (2010).
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website either directly, by selling goods on the site, or indirectly, by selling
user information and advertising space or marketing and publicizing other
ventures.24 Website operators also exert legal power over their users through
the use of clickwrap agreements and terms of use. 25 They can require user
registration, block certain Internet protocol addresses, and remove content.
Yet, despite their proprietorship powers, website operators generally are im-
mune from liability for any harm that arises from content posted by a third
party under section 230 of the CDA.26
A. Definitional Fuzziness and Cyber Mystification
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides as follows:
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).27
The statute does not explain what "treated as the publisher or speaker"
means and does not mention immunity at all; yet, courts have construed sec-
tion 230 to mean that website operators are immune from liability as pub-
lishers or distributors for content posted on their websites by third parties so
24. Kim, supra note 17, at 1034-35.
25. Id at 1034.
26. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
doubts should be resolved in favor of immunity); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-
333 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the CDA immunized interactive computer service provider that
hosted message board, even though it refused to remove false statement after notice); Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006) (noting that section 230 "does not permit Internet ser-
vice providers or users to be sued as 'distributors."').
27. The reference to paragraph I may be intended to read "(A)." Communications Decency
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 et. seq.).
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long as the website operators did not contribute to the creation of the content.28
In other words, section 230 (at least, as interpreted by the majority of courts)
29
treats website operators-not like publishers or even distributors-but like
common carriers with no interest or liability in the content they transport.
30
Website operators are similar to other common carriers in that they transport
large quantities of material, but there are important differences. Website op-
erators do more than transport information; they are also the destination for
that information. The nature of the material being transported is also different
from a telephone call or a piece of mail, as it is publicly viewable and easily
distributable. The relationship of a traditional carrier to the material it
transports is temporary whereas a website's relationship to its material is per-
manent, its name forever associated with the material. Because website oper-
ators not only transport, but also host the material, they have greater control
over it. Even search engines that are most similar to traditional carriers have
greater control over their material than their physical world counterparts. Be-
cause their transportation of material is repeated rather than one-time, they
may be able to control subsequent transmissions of harmful material. Further-
more, they have greater control over the information because it can be digitally
inspected or monitored.3'
Without the threat of liability, websites are free to encourage the worst
from their users. They may design their websites to capitalize on impulsivity
and anonymity, removing architectural restraints (such as registration require-
ments or review periods) and goading users to write salacious material about
others.32 For example, one gossip website encourages its collegiate users to
"Go ahead, tell it like it is ...always 100% anonymous . . ."33 That same
website hosted a contest that encouraged users to "think of something contro-
versial" to win prizes:
28. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327; Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529. See
also Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Cf David S. Ardia, Free Speech
Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 373, 381 (2010) (noting that section
230 "has not been the 'free pass"' that many believe it is). At least one court has found that section
230 precludes treating intermediaries as publishers not just for the purposes of defamation law but
"in general." See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (noting that "section 230(c)(1) precludes courts from
treating [lnternet service providers as publishers not just for the purposes of defamation law, with
its particular distinction between primary and secondary publishers, but in general. The statute
does not mention defamation, and we decline to read the principles of defamation law into it.").
29. Nancy S. Kim, Imposing Tort Liability on Websites for Cyber Harassment, 118 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 116-18 (2008) available at http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/732.pdf.
30. Elsewhere, I have argued that a reasonableness standard should be imposed upon website
proprietors. See Kim, supra note 17, at 1012-47. See also Kim, supra note 29, at 117-18.
31. Kim, supra note 17, at 997.
32. Jaron Lanier observes, "Behavior varies considerably from site to site. There are reason-
able theories about what brings out the best or worst online behaviors .... My opinion, however,
is that certain details in the design of the user interface experience of a website are the most im-
portant factors." LANIER, supra note 23, at 62-63.
33. CAMPusGosslP, http://www.campusgossip.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
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THE GOSSIP POST THAT RECEIVES THE MOST VIEWS, AND THE
MOST COMMENTS (REAL COMMENTS) TODAY WILL RECEIVE
PRIZES FROM CAMPUSGOSSIP.COM! THINK OF SOMETHING
CONTROVERSIAL, TELL YOUR FRIENDS IT'S POSTED ON OUR
SITE, AND YOU'LL BE SURE TO WIN! WINNERS WILL BE
ANNOUNCED TOMORROW AFTERNOON (THURSDAY) ON THIS
SAME POST, SO LOOK FOR IT IN THE GOSSIP SECTION UNDER
THE "RANDOM" SCHOOL SECTION! TO POST SOME GOSSIP
SIMPLY CLICK "POST GOSSIP" ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE
PAGE !14
Websites that encourage users to post negative information about others
target those who are least likely to consider the long-term implications of their
posts such as spurned lovers or college students. 35 Not surprisingly, the tar-
geted user may react by posting material in an emotionally charged state that
she may later regret. Unfortunately, current law does not require website
operators to remove postings even where requested to do so by the original,
repentant poster.36 Benefitted by increased traffic and protected by section 230
immunity, the website operator has no incentive to respond to the original
poster's takedown request.
There is a tendency in conversations about online use to use blanket terms
that conflate meanings. For example, the Internet is a network of computers in
which the computers are capable of communicating with each other,3 7 but the
term Internet is also commonly used to describe the various websites and ac-
tivities accessible using this network. 38 The term website is also used in a sin-
gular way, to describe any site residing at a URL 9 Yet, websites differ in
purpose, size, traffic, resources, and revenue models. At the time the personal
computer and the Internet became available to the masses, catchall, mystifying
terms such as cyberspace and the Net reflected the discomfort of the public
towards the novelty of the medium and with technology in general. Yet, the
imprecise terminology used to describe online activity often leads to imprecise
34. Gossip Comments, CAMPUSGOSSIP (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:36:52 AM), http://www.campus
gossip.com/home-page-6880.html.
35. DONTDATEHIMGIRL, http://www.dontdatehimgirl.com (last visited July 31, 2012);
THEDIRTY, http://www.thedirty.com (last visited July 31, 2012).
36. Kim, supra note 17, at 993.
37. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 93-94 (2000). Section 230(0(1) defines the term
Internet as "the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable
packet switched data networks." See also Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(1) (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 83 (2006) ("The Internet is a medium of
communication. People do things 'on' the Internet.").
38. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 453 (2003) (discussing how "everyone employs physical vocabulary to talk
about events, transactions, and systems that exist or occur online.").
39. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a website as "a document or a set of linked
documents, usually associated with a particular person, organization, or topic, that is held on such
a computer system and can be accessed as part of the World Wide Web." Web site, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (June 2012), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/253976?redirectedFrom=web
site#eid.
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discussions or policy solutions that are over- or underinclusive. For example,
legislation to combat cyber harassment often fails to address certain unlawful
behavior or includes within its ambit too much lawful behavior.
40
Another imprecise term, interactive computer service provider, is con-
tained in section 230 itself. Section 230 defines "interactive computer service"
provider as "any information service, system or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational in-
stitutions.' Courts have interpreted "interactive computer service provider"
to include all intermediaries. 42 Yet, this definition does not distinguish be-
tween gossip sites that solicit damaging content, such as Campus Gossip, and
Internet service providers (ISPs) like AOL that function more like passive
conduits. The range of interactive computer service providers is wide. Some
interactive computer service providers merely transport content. Other web-
sites function like publishers and hold themselves out to the public as the place
to go to read a particular type of content. Some message boards traffic in gos-
sip and reputation smearing; others in facilitating the buying and selling of
goods and services. Yet, courts fail to recognize these distinctions for purposes
of determining section 230 immunity.
The definitional fuzziness of section 230 also extends to another subsec-
tion. Interactive computer service providers are immune from liability for
content posted by another; however, section 230 does not protect website op-
erators for content that the website operator itself posted or created.43 Under
section 230(f)(3), "information content provider" is defined as "any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service." Yet, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Fair Housing Council of San Fer-
nando v. Roommates.com, a website operator can be both a service provider
and an information content provider, and it can be liable as an information
40. For example, a recent proposed House of Representatives bill states as follows: "(a)
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with the intent to co-
erce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic means
to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both." Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111 th
Cong. § 3(a) (2009). The bill, however, does not provide standards or definitions for what consti-
tutes, for example, coercion or intimidation. Id. The proposed bill provides for fines and incarcer-
ation for violation of the law. Id.
41.47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006).
42. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d
1157, 1161-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing an operator of a website matching landlords and tenants
as an "interactive computer services" provider). The Ninth Circuit found that "the most common
interactive computer services are websites." Id. n.6 at 1162; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that an online dating site is an "interactive
computer service").
43. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162 (noting that "grant of immunity" under section 230
applies "only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an 'information content
provider').
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content provider "even if the information originated with a user." A website
operator can "edit" content without liability, but it cannot "create" or "de-
velop" it, either "in whole or in part" without losing immunity.45 Not surpris-
ingly, the line between editing and that of developing and creating is often
blurred.4 6 The Ninth Circuit, for example, distinguished between passive trans-
mitters of information and those who help develop content, but admitted the
difficulties with its interpretation of "develop. 47
B. Civil Liability and Website Proprietorship
In an earlier article, I argued that website operators should be subject to
proprietorship liability, meaning that they should take reasonable measures to
prevent foreseeable harms.48 This article clarifies and develops the meaning of
proprietorship liability to include all civil liability. 49 Brick-and-mortar busi-
nesses are subject to standards of reasonableness in the way they conduct their
business, such as being required to take "reasonable measures" to prevent
"foreseeable harm."50 Online businesses should be subject to the same stand-
ard of reasonableness, although how that standard is applied (that is, what is
considered reasonable business conduct) should differ depending upon the
nature of the business.
The imposition of proprietorship liability deters socially harmful business
practices and encourages socially beneficial innovation. 51 A reasonableness
44. Id. at 1165 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003)).
45. Id. at 1163 (noting that in passing section 230, "Congress sought to immunize the re-
moval of user-generated content, not the creation of content").
46. For example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted development as "referring not merely to
augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In
other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct." Id. at 1167-68.
47. These difficulties include that "the broadest sense of the term 'develop' could include the
functions of an ordinary search engine-indeed, just about any function performed by a website."
Id. at 1167.
48. See Kim, supra note 17, at 1034-47. As noted earlier, most courts have found that
section 230 does not permit civil liability. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir.
2008) (finding that section 230 bars negligence and gross negligence claims).
49. Other scholars have proposed looking to tort law to address online problems. For exam-
ple, Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig have proposed imposing a limited duty of care upon
websites when they have been given actual notice. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 19, at 373.
They state that "[w]hen a website realizes that its services have created a condition involving an
unreasonable risk of a cybertort, it should also have a duty to mitigate damages. Websites are not
necessarily mere pipes or conduits; they also play a role in creating or enabling cybertorts or
infringement." James Grimmelmann has analogized product safety with privacy safety on social
networking sites such as Facebook. See Grimmelmann, supra note 8, at 820-21 (noting that,
"good product design discourages or prevents particularly hazardous uses" and observes that
"consumer expectations pervade products liability." While he does not advocate the direct appli-
cation of products liability law to online privacy, he suggests that products liability law might help
shape online social privacy law. Id. at 826-27.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
51. Jacqueline Lipton writes that "traditional Property rights entail significant concurrent
obligations or responsibilities imposed on the proprietary owner as an incident of their Property
ownership. Historically, Property rights have never been absolute. They have always involved
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standard enables courts to address discrepancies in types of businesses without
being constrained by rules that will be quickly rendered anachronistic by tech-
nology and changes in the business environment. Size matters. Small busi-
nesses have different requirements than larger, more established businesses.
The nature of the business also matters. The concerns raised by consumer
review websites may be very different from those raised by gossip sites. ISPs
may have a much harder time prescreening content than lightly trafficked
websites. Even gossip sites should not all be lumped together. Gossip sites
covering public figures such as celebrities and politicians should be treated
differently from those gossip sites featuring college students or other private
individuals. A reasonableness standard enables courts to recognize and parse
those differences.
Unfortunately, the judicial interpretation of section 230 lumps all online
entities together and focuses on whether the website operator had a role in the
development of content, which is relevant to the issue of whether it qualifies as
a publisher or speaker. The issue of whether a website operator is a publisher
or speaker, in turn, is relevant where the cause of action requires a determina-
tion of status as a publisher or speaker, for example, in a claim of defamation
(although not only in cases of defamation). 52 The publisher-speaker determina-
tion is irrelevant where the cause of action is not based upon liability as a pub-
lisher or speaker (that is, in cases where liability is based upon status as a
distributor or in other civil liability lawsuits.) 53 The language of section 230
avails itself of such an interpretation. Notably, section 230(c)(1) does not
mention immunity for intermediaries. The only exculpatory language in all of
section 230 is in subsection (c)(2) with respect to efforts to restrict access to
objectionable materials. It is not the language of the existing legislation that is
problematic but the expansive judicial interpretation and application of 230
immunity. 54
Contrary to how many courts have interpreted section 230, 55 the plain
language of the provision accommodates the recognition of tort liability. The
limitations, often in the form of legal duties owed to others." Jacqueline Lipton, Information
Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 148-49 (2004).
52. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that section 230(c)(1)
protection extends beyond defamation).
53. Felix Wu makes a similar point in a recent article. He states that "§ 230 applies to claims
that attempt to make intermediaries stand in the shoes of original speakers." Felix T. Wu,
Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293,
342 (2011). Wu argues that "because intermediaries and original speakers have different incen-
tives to speak. . . . applying liability as if they were interchangeable has negative results for
speech .... But if a cause of action is not trying to treat an intermediary as a speaker ... then the
intermediary's incentives to speak are no longer relevant." Id.
54. Rustad and Koenig state that "an activist judiciary . . . has radically expanded § 230 by
conferring immunity on distributors." Rustad & Koenig, supra note 19, at 371.
55. See generally Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418-20 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to
recognize "virtual premises" liability); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding no liability for a matchmaking service for information posted by a third party);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding broad immunity); Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006) (finding no liability for posting an e-mail created by a third
party).
SUMMER 2012
caption for subsection (c) is "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material. While headings should not be conclusive, the caption indi-
cates that Congress intended to protect blocking and screening activities of
intermediaries, an observation that both the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits
have made in recent opinions. 56 This seems particularly true when considered
in context. Subsection (c) was enacted, at least in part, in response to the ruling
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,57 which found an ISP liable
for defamation as a publisher.58 The court held that because the defendant
attempted to screen out offensive materials, it had assumed greater liability
than if it had made no screening attempt whatsoever.59
Section 230(c)(2). states as follows:
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).60
If (c)(2), captioned "civil liability," were intended to immunize ISPs from
all civil liability (not just liability in connection with good faith efforts to re-
strict or remove content) that would by definition include civil actions based
upon their status as a publisher or speaker. Yet, that interpretation seems
flawed in light of the subsection immediately preceding it, section 230(c)(1).
This section states:
56. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d
1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he section is titled, 'Protection for "good samaritan" blocking
and screening of offensive material' and, as the Seventh Circuit recently held, the substance of
section 230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with its caption.") (citing Chicago
Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003))).
57. No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); 141 CONG. REC.
H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Rep. Cox and Rep. Wyden). See also
Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163.
Section 230 was prompted by a state court case holding Prodigy responsible for a libelous message
posted on one of its financial message boards.... Under the reasoning of Stratton Oakmont, online
service providers that voluntarily filter some messages become liable for all messages transmitted,
whereas providers that bury their heads in the sand and ignore problematic posts altogether escape
liability .... In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare interactive computer services this
grim choice by allowing them to perform some editing on user-generated content without thereby
becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn't edit or delete.
Id.
58. No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) at *4-5.
59. Id.
60. The reference to paragraph I may be intended to read "(A)." 47 U.S.C. § 230 et. seq.
(2006)).
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(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
Subsection (e) states that section 230 has no effect on federal criminal law or
intellectual property law.6 1 Therefore, if subsection (c)(2) were intended to
immunize intermediaries from all civil liability, then section 230(c)(1) (with
the caption "Treatment of publisher or speaker") would serve only to protect
the ISP in state criminal actions where liability was based upon the provider's
status as a publisher or speaker. If this was in fact what Congress intended, it
would have said so and have drafted section 230(c)(1) more clearly to indicate
its applicability only to state criminal law prosecutions.
Furthermore, if Congress intended section 230(c)(2) to exculpate website
operators from all civil liability, it would not have carved out an exemption for
particular acts, that is, the good faith removal of obscene material. A better
interpretation would be that section (c)(1) prohibits claims against an interac-
tive computer service provider, which are based upon its status as a publisher
or speaker. Where the civil claim is not based upon its status as a publisher or
speaker, the interactive computer service provider is not liable for good faith
efforts to remove offensive material or to restrict access to such materials. By
implication, the computer service provider may be liable for actions that are
not efforts to limit access to offensive materials.
Another subsection, 230(e)(3), captioned "State law," specifically states
that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law
that is inconsistent with this section." But what other state law is there than
state criminal law if the ISP has broad immunity in civil actions? Section
230(e)(1) states that section 230 has no effect on federal criminal law. Ac-
cordingly, if section 230(e)(3) were intended to include only state criminal
law, the drafters would have expressly so stated with a caption "State criminal
law" rather than the broader "State law."
A better interpretation of section 230(e)(3) would be that the drafters
intended to leave intact state laws, both criminal and civil, that did not impose
publisher or speaker liability on website operators for content created by third
parties. More specifically, a plaintiff could not sue a website operator as the
original publisher or speaker for content posted by a third party, but it could
sue a website operator for its negligence in conducting its business as an in-
termediary and distributor of content. Under this interpretation of section 230,
no change to the statutory language would be necessary to recognize website
proprietorship liability.
61.47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(2).
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Some influential courts have already recognized the potential limits of
section 230 of the CDA. The Seventh Circuit expressed doubt that the statute
should be interpreted to provide website operators with absolute immunity. It
referenced one of its previous opinions, Doe v. GTE Corp.,62 in stating "why
section 230(c) as a whole cannot be understood as a general prohibition of
civil liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts." 63 It hinted
that section 230 may not mean broad immunity for all civil liability but only
those based upon its status as a publisher or speaker: "[P]erhaps section
230(c)(1) forecloses any liability that depends on deeming the ISP a 'pub-
lisher'-defamation law would be a good example of such liability-while
permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as intermediaries.
64
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also noted the limits of section 230
immunity. In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC,65 it stated that the "Communications Decency Act was not
meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the Internet."66 It noted that "the
substance of section 230(c) can and should be interpreted consistent with its
caption," which reads "Protection for 'good samaritan' blocking and screening
of offensive material." 67 In a footnote, it observed that holding businesses
liable for their own conduct did not seem to be unduly burdensome.
68
Both the Roommates and the Craigslist cases suggest that at least the
Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit courts recognize limits to section 230
immunity. These limits are based upon the statutory language itself, which
states that interactive computer service providers who are not content creators
or developers shall not be treated as publishers or speakers. Both courts noted
that the caption of section 230(c) references protection for "good samaritan"
blocking and screening of offensive material. The Ninth Circuit noted that the
exemption from civil liability is with respect to actions taken to restrict access
to objectionable content-"not the creation of content." 69
The conferral of section 230 immunity has led to egregious results, which
make a mockery of the term good samaritan when applied to certain websites.
Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig provide one example:
The unintended consequence of immunizing all ISPs from tort liability is that
this confers an absolute immunity on feral ISPs that harm the public. In
Ramey v. Darkside Productions, Inc., an online adult services website pub-
lished unauthorized sexually explicit photographs of the plaintiff in its Eros
Guide, using content supplied by a customer. The court ruled that the pomo-
62. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
63. Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
64. Id. at 670.
65. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
66. Id. at 1164.
67. Id. at 1163-64 (citing Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 669 (quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347
F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68. Id. at 1169 n.24.
69. Id. at 1163 (noting that "Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated
content, not the creation of content.").
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graphic website was immunized from liability for the plaintiff's tort claims
... . The Darkside court described the § 230(c) "immunity as quite robust,
adopting a relatively expansive definition of 'interactive computer service'
and a relatively restrictive definition of 'information content provider."' The
website compartmentalized its adult entertainment content and even placed a
watermark on the unauthorized photographs. Despite these compelling facts,
the court ruled that the federal immunity for publishers applied, granted
summary judgment in favor of the pornographer, and left the plaintiff with no
redress for her injuries.70
In determining whether to impose proprietorship liability in a given situa-
tion, a court should consider whether the website operator took reasonable
measures to prevent foreseeable harm. This is the same standard adopted by
courts to determine liability for premises-based businesses.7 A reasonableness
analysis recognizes the variations among businesses. It considers the differ-
ences between online and offline businesses and differences among web-based
businesses, including the large volume of traffic on some sites, the difficulty of
controlling user conduct, and the problems created by anonymity. The benefit
of a reasonableness analysis is that it is an evolving standard and thus one that
accommodates technological advancements, societal changes, and adaptations
to technology. For example, while a particular website may not be a mere
conduit or a common carrier, prescreening content may be difficult and may
cause undesirable delays.7 a Yet, as the technology improves, it may be more
realistic to expect website operators to employ prescreening tools. 7 3 Further-
more, a website operator's actions in light of the ability to airbrush out an
image or the identity of a particular individual should be considered in a rea-
sonableness analysis. Imagine, for example, that a user posts an image of her
daughter's ballet class. One of the girls in the class is wearing a light colored
leotard that reveals too much of her developing body. The legal guardian of
the girl requests that the daughter's image be removed. The website operator
can accommodate that request without removing the entire team photo simply
by cropping out or blurring the girl's image or by requiring the poster to do so.
70. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 19, at 374.
71. See Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1993); Seibert v. Vic Regnier
Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Kan. 1993) Barker v. Wah Low, 19 Cal. App. 3d 710, 714-
15 (App. Div. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
72. As the Seventh Circuit noted, "if postings had to be reviewed before being put online,
long delay could make the service much less useful, and if the vetting came only after the material
was online the buyers and sellers might already have made their deals." Craigslist, 519 F.3d at
669.
73. Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment. How Internet Service
Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1279, 1311 (2010) (stating that "technologies for monitoring, filtering, and inspecting
content have substantially improved" from when the CDA was first enacted). Frieden questions
whether an "ISP can continue to qualify for safe harbor exemptions based on its lack of ability to
monitor and manage content, or assumptions that content management would constitute an unrea-
sonable operational or financial burden on ISPs." Id. at 1312.
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The imposition of proprietorship liability recognizes the policy objectives
of section 230 (to both encourage Internet growth and greater user control over
offensive content) and encourages the development and use of the Internet in a
socially beneficial manner. The current broad immunity promotes technolog-
ical development that is lopsided in favor of growth without social responsi-
bility. Website proprietorship liability, on the other hand, conforms to societal
expectations of reasonable business practices. Far from being an unduly harsh
burden on online businesses,74 it merely requires them to be accountable for
the products and services that they release to the public. Website proprietor-
ship liability would promote the objectives of both section 23075 and tort law.
II. WEBSITE DESIGN AND CULTURE
AND THE TWO REGRETTABLE BEHAVIORS
This Part discusses two regrettable online behaviors. The first is impulsive
posting, which is the posting of content without deliberation of the long-term
consequences. The second regrettable behavior, third-party posting, is the
posting of content about third parties without their consent. Additionally, an
explanation is given about how the choices that website operators make re-
garding site design and site culture can temper or exacerbate the consequences
of these two regrettable behaviors.
A. Two Regrettable Online Behaviors
In the past fifteen years or so, an online culture has emerged with two
regrettable online behaviors. The lack of barriers to distribution and the speed
of digital communication have resulted in impulsive posting of content.
Thoughtfulness and deliberateness have taken a back seat to speediness. Trig-
ger happy e-mailers press send first and feel regret later, and seasoned jour-
nalists find themselves "scooped" by amateur bloggers who publish rumors
and speculation. The pace of communication grows ever more swiftly, via text
messaging, Twitter and Facebook. The barriers to publication have disap-
peared and with them, quality controls, fact checking, and proper grammar and
spelling. There is an additional hazard that comes with speed: emotionalism. A
rapid reply is often an emotionally charged one, with no counting to ten before
74. I use the term businesses in a calculated manner as I propose a safe harbor for nonprofit
sites. See infra Part I.
75. Section 230(b) states that the "policy of the United States" is as follows:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services
and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what infor-
mation is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive
computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technolo-
gies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in ob-
scenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
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posting. While there may be benefits to some impulsive postings-such as
timeliness and spontaneity and maybe, in some cases, a type of creativity that
results from lack of contemplation-those benefits should be considered
against the potential harms, especially when combined with the second re-
grettable behavior.
The second regrettable online behavior is the posting of information about
third parties, without their consent. As with impulsive posting, third-party
posting can be socially beneficial. The public may be warned about nefarious
characters, hazardous products or fraudulent businesses. One can share good
news about a friend on a social networking site. But third-party posting can
also be very harmful. A malicious poster can reveal secrets and post private
images. The ubiquity of cellular phones with cameras can hinder our everyday
activities turning, for example, an excursion to the gym into an opportunity for
online harassment. 76 Third-party posting, whether well intentioned, strips the
subject of a person's autonomy in that she is no longer able to make the deci-
sion about whether to share personal information or experiences.
Something combustible often occurs when these two regrettable behaviors
coincide. Impulsive posting about third parties can be gossipy, mean, and
vengeful. Even when it is simply thoughtless, misguided, and clueless, such
postings can cause reputational and emotional harm that cannot be entirely
erased. The stakes are high and can affect the subject of the post for years to
come. An unflattering post may affect one's job prospects, for example, as
more companies use social media to conduct background checks of potential
employees. 77 While some may argue that impulsive or third-party posting is
not always bad, posts that are the result of thoughtful deliberation are, norma-
tively speaking, almost always better. Society benefits from self-editing. Self-
editing is not the same as institutional or governmental censorship. Similarly,
garnering consent from third parties before posting information about them is
also better as a norm. Unfortunately, these two regrettable behaviors have a
way of spreading virally throughout the online culture as users conform to
their influence and thus perpetuate them.
As noted in Part I, a determination of reasonableness for purposes of web-
site proprietorship liability should be fact and context based. The reasonable-
ness of measures adopted by a leanly staffed start-up with little traffic should
not be compared with the measures adopted by an online giant like Facebook
or Google. Website operators affect the way users conduct themselves on a
site through website design and the fostering of a particular culture. For ex-
ample, a website that permits anonymous postings invites greater openness
and less formality. Users may also exercise less self-restraint and inhibition.
Website operators should be cognizant of the way design interacts with the
two regrettable online behaviors. This does not mean that website operators
76. See Catherine Saint Louis, Cellphones Test Strength of Gym Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2011, atE1.
77. Preston, supra note 15 (discussing a company that "scrapes the Internet for everything
prospective employees may have said or done online in the past seven years."). The information
obtained by that company has resulted in job offers being withdrawn. Id.
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should never permit impulsive or third-party posting; what it does mean is that
they should anticipate and implement safeguards to prevent the negative con-
sequences that so frequently accompany them. Part II.B discusses some of
these safeguards.
B. Reasonable Proprietorship, Website Design, and Culture
As previously discussed, website operators should take reasonable steps to
prevent foreseeable harm. Where the website operator designs its site to facil-
itate or encourage one or both of the regrettable behaviors, it should anticipate
certain bad faith postings by its users. For example, while most websites want
more traffic, what they do to increase traffic and what they want from their
users differs. A retailer, like Amazon.com, wants to encourage users to buy. A
news-oriented website such as the Huffington Post wants users to read content,
not only to generate more ad revenue, but also to gain influence over public
opinion. Some websites, such as Facebook or YouTube, want their users to
create content. But even user generated content sites have different objectives.
Facebook wants user generated content so that its members can better com-
municate with their friends. The objective is to extend and enhance social
networks. Accordingly, the traffic generated is to individual user accounts on
Facebook. YouTube, on the other hand, wants user-generated content that
entertains and draws a broad audience of strangers. Presumably YouTube
benefits more from clips that appeal to a large cross section of the population
rather than those of interest primarily to the posters and their friends.78 Face-
book intends for user-generated content to strengthen social bonds among
friends and acquaintances whereas YouTube wants its user generated content
to attract the attention of the masses. On both sites, there is no prescreening of
content and users can post content easily. However, both Facebook and
YouTube have tempered the negative effects of impulsive postings through the
design of their sites. Both sites discourage impulsive postings by requiring
registration before uploading content. Registration requires submission of an
e-mail address, a username, postal code, date of birth and gender. 79 Even if
posters use a pseudonym and are unknown to the general public, they are
identifiable by the website unless they take affirmative steps to create a false
identity and an associated fake e-mail account. Each required step mitigates
the impulsivity norm.
A site's motivations for registration may differ. In a book about the social
networking site, MySpace, Julie Angwin explains how the company made a
78. YouTube recently announced plans to create designated channels to highlight more
professionally created content. See Ian Paul, YouTube Spending $100M to Compete with
Broadcast TV, PCWORLD (Apr. 7, 2011, 7:53 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/224523/you
tube.spending_100mto-compete with-broadcasttv.html.
79. Create a New Google Account, GOOGLE, https://accounts.google.com/SignUp (last
visited Aug. 17, 2012) (YouTube accounts are created through signing up for a Google account.);
Sign Up for Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/r.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2012).
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conscious business decision to allow "Fakesters," or members who use fake
identities to cultivate an unrefined, irreverent culture.
80
YouTube requires posters to be registered with the site, but visitors are
free to watch videos without registering. 81 YouTube encourages viewers to
browse by making it easy to do so, by listing popular videos on its home page,
categorizing videos and creating personalized recommendations, and high-
lighting video trends. 82 YouTube thus designs its website to encourage impul-
sive viewing and tempers the negative consequences of impulsive posting with
a registration requirement.
Facebook also requires registration to join the site. 83 Postings after regis-
tration are intended to be instantaneous and frequent. The design of Facebook
encourages impulsivity but the negative consequences of impulsivity are tem-
pered by the nature of the site itself, which discourages anonymity. 84 A mem-
ber's page can be either open to the public or closed, but the member must be
identified to attract viewers. If a member uses a pseudonym, she must still
notify others for them to gain access to her Facebook postings. Facebook also
has a "safety center" to provide resources to address online safety concerns
relating to juvenile users.85 One safety feature, the social reporting tool, ad-
dresses third-party posting. This tool permits a user to directly ask another
Facebook member to remove a post or photo, and remove a friend or block an
offending poster.86 The user can also request Facebook to remove the offen-
sive post.
87
By contrast, gossip sites exploit both regrettable behaviors and specialize
in getting users to impulsively post content about others. The gossip site,
TheDirty.com, encourages users to "Submit Dirt" via a large button on the
home page.8 8 Users are not required to register and can either e-mail the web-
site or upload the content directly. The operator of the site adds denigrating
comments to posted images of women, thereby encouraging the culture of
80. JULIE ANGWIN, STEALING MY SPACE: THE BATrLE TO CONTROL THE MOST POPULAR
WEBSITE IN AMERICA 59-63 (2009).
81. YoUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
82. Id.
83. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
84. Facebook has undergone public criticism because of its efforts to make private infor-
mation public. See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Report: Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Doesn't
Believe in Privacy, WIRED (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/04/report-
facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-doesnt-believe-in-privacy/.
85. Family Safety Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/safety/ (last visited Aug. 1,
2012).
86. Facebook Safety, Details on Social Reporting, FACEBOOK (Mar. 10, 2011, 4:09am),
http://www.facebook.com/safety/. See Larry Magrid, New Facebook Safety Center Helps, But
Safety Remains a Shared Responsibility, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/larry-magrid/new-facebook-safety-cente -b 851261.html.
87. Id.; Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/community
standards (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
88. THEDIRTY, supra note 35.
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online stone throwing. 89 Another website, Campusgossip.com, also makes
posting content easy, including a button labeled, "Upload and Move On."
90
Posters are not required to register and posting is fast and anonymous or pseu-
donymous. Just as registration and the possibility of identification encourage
accountability, nonregistration encourages impulsivity and a lack of accounta-
bility.
The culture established by each website can either mitigate or exacerbate
the two regrettable behaviors. A website that purports to help you "connect
and share with the people in your life"9 1 emphasizes a participatory culture
that depends upon the user's identity and reputation, whereas a site that urges
users to "submit dirt ' 92 with pictures on the home page of scantily clad women
fosters a voyeuristic, misogynistic culture where posters and viewers can mock
and condemn without fear of their identities being revealed.
Another way that site operators can establish a culture is through their
terms of use or "community guidelines." 93 Some sites, for example, forbid the
posting of hate speech 94 or sexually explicit content. 95 Other sites tout their
status as "gossip and satire" sites and expressly disclaim responsibility for
posted information. 96 A site can require a user to read the guidelines before
posting, or may impose them in a more passive way, through a link on the site.
A site that requires clicking "I agree" to the websites community guidelines
before posting may ameliorate some of the negative effects of the two regret-
table behaviors by inserting a delay in the posting process and by reminding
the poster of behavioral expectations.
Websites that encourage impulsive postings, third-party postings, or both,
should expect that some users will upload content that they will later regret
and wish to remove. Some websites temper impulsive postings by enabling the
user to directly remove previously uploaded content. Facebook, for example,
gives users the ability to remove content that they posted. However, other sites
do not give users control over their content once it is posted.97
Another way that site operators can cultivate a particular culture is by
actively monitoring the site for inappropriate content. A website operator can,
for example, delete posts that violate its terms of use or guidelines. On the
other hand, an operator who wishes to foster a crude and vulgar site might tout
its refusal to monitor comments and may disclaim responsibility for content.
89. See Kevin Engstrom, The Dirty on TheDirty.com: Founder Claims Woman Trashing Site
"Needed" by Society, Above Canadian Law, WINNIPEG SUN (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.winnipeg
sun.com/news/columnists/kevin-engstrom/2011/04/09/17936936.html.
90. Post a Pic, CAMPuSGOSSiP, http://www.campusgossip.com/post-a-picture (last visited
July 31, 2012).
91. FACEBOOK, supra note 83.
92. THEDIRTY, supra note 35.
93. See Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community-guide
lines (last visited July 31, 2012).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Terms of Use, THEDIRTY, http://thedirty.com/terms-of-use/ (last visited July 31, 2012).
97. See id.; RIPOFF REPORT, http://www.ripoffreports.com (last visited July 31, 2012) (Ripoff
Report's policy is not to remove posts by users under any circumstances.).
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1. A Reasonable Cyber Harassment Policy
A foreseeable consequence of impulsive and third-party posting is the
posting of content that is defamatory or invasive of a third party's privacy. All
websites that permit user-generated content should anticipate complaints and
requests from third parties for removal of content. Accordingly, these website
operators should implement harassment policies to address complaints in a
timely manner in the same way companies have implemented policies to deter
sexual harassment. A cyber harassment policy educates its users, establishes
norms of conduct, and raises awareness about the consequences of unac-
ceptable actions. While prescreening may not be feasible in many cases, a
website should have standards for internal review of content. Such a policy
should be reasonable on its face and have a way of addressing common prob-
lems created by the two regrettable behaviors. The rest of this subsection pro-
vides examples of situations that should be anticipated by a website operator
that permits posting of content by users.
a. Websites Should Take Down Material Upon Request of the Poster
A website operator that permits user generated content on its site should
anticipate the occasional remorseful poster, someone who has fallen victim to
one or both of the regrettable behaviors and later wishes to retract a post.
Under section 230, a website is not liable for content, even if it is false or
otherwise tortious. The original poster, however, is not immune from tort lia-
bility. Furthermore, the likelihood of harm (and potential magnitude of dam-
ages for which the poster is liable) increases the longer the material remains on
the website. The views expressed may no longer reflect those of the poster. A
reasonable cyber harassment policy should include taking down material upon
request of the poster. The burden on the website's resources is minimal. A
takedown request by the original poster does not require onerous prescreening
or difficult subjective decisions on the part of the website operator. Posters can
be contractually prohibited from requesting more than a specified number of
takedown requests and repeat offenders can be banned from the website,
thereby limiting the administrative burden of responding to fickle or ambiva-
lent posters. Given the minimal burden upon the website operator, the poten-
tial liability of the poster, and the importance of autonomous expression, a
reasonable cyber harassment policy should include the removal of posting
upon request of the original poster.
b. Websites Should Take Down Unauthorized Nude Images
Upon Request of the Subject
Online postings are widely distributable and easily reproducible and nude
images have the potential to create devastating harm. In Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., the plaintiff sued Yahoo! for failing to remove unauthorized "profiles,"
which included nude pictures of the plaintiff that had been posted by her ex-
boyfriend. 98 The plaintiff's ex-boyfriend posed as the plaintiff in Yahoo!'s
98. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).
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online chat rooms and directed men to the profiles that he had created. 99 As a
result, strangers seeking sex bombarded the plaintiff with e-mails, phone calls
and personal visits. 100 Yahoo! failed to remove the profiles for several months,
removing them only when the plaintiff filed the lawsuit.'0 ' The federal district
court held that section 230 barred plaintiff's claim.'0 2 While the Ninth Circuit
agreed that section 230 barred the plaintiffs claim "under Oregon law, for
negligent provision of services," the court went on to state that the plaintiff
may have a claim under a theory of promissory estoppel, which would not be
barred by section 230.103
A reasonable cyber harassment policy should include a process by which
unauthorized nude images are immediately removed upon request of the sub-
ject. The Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. case illustrates the necessity of immediate
action when unauthorized nude images are posted online. While a photogra-
pher may have an expressive right and a copyright in her photographs, an
individual has a personal interest in her image. The website, however, has no
rights in images posted by third parties (unless it obtains those rights contrac-
tually). If, as alleged, Yahoo! failed to remove the images of the plaintiff
within a reasonable time after receiving notice (including receipt of a copy of
her photo ID and a signed statement denying her involvement with the fraud-
ulent profiles)' 4 from the plaintiff, Yahoo!'s conduct would be unreasonable.
On the other hand, if the profiles were removed but were then reposted, the
issue of reasonableness would depend upon whether the company was able to
block the repostings by, for example, banning the ex-boyfriend from the
site. 10
5
Unauthorized posting of nude images disproportionately harms those
individuals who do not conform to mainstream society views of sexuality. The
term sexuality harassment is used here to refer to situations where perpetrators
single out for ridicule or aggression individuals on the basis of their sexuality.
Sexuality's meaning is broad and expansive. 10 6 1 use the term sexuality in this
article to refer to biological factors as well as societal constructs. It can refer to
gender identification, sexual orientation, the sex act itself, or signals and sig-
naling mechanisms to potential sexual partners or society at large. It captures
the way individuals talk, dress, walk, and shake their hair. Sexuality thus im-
plicates core issues relating to self-expression, identity, and self-actualization.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1098-99.
102. Id. at 1099.
103. Id. at 1105-06.
104. Id. at 1098-99 (noting that after Barnes requested that Yahoo! remove the unauthorized
profiles it allegedly "did not respond.").
105. Yahoo! should also have responded in a timely manner. Instead, the court found that a
month after Barnes complained, the company still had not responded. Id.
106. Webster's dictionary defines sexuality as "1. The condition of being characterized by
sex. 2. Concern with or interest in sexual activity. 3. The quality of having a sexual character or
potency." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1012 (1995), s.v., "sexuality."
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Although highly personal, sexuality extends beyond the individual and is
shaped by and reflects political and social dynamics. A boy growing up in a
traditional household in a conservative small town may be reluctant to express
his sexual interest in other boys. A student at a large university in a cosmopol-
itan city may conceal her lack of sexual experience. A man may hide his desire
to wear women's underwear. In other words, sexuality harassment reflects a
societal judgment or normative bias against a particular expression of sexu-
ality. In fact, it is societal approbation that characterizes and distinguishes
sexuality harassment.10 7
Unfortunate sexual stereotypes and harsh societal realities make the con-
sequences of unauthorized nude postings different depending upon the sub-
ject.'0 8 To make generalizations can be dangerous, but consider the Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc. case with roles reversed. It would be difficult to imagine a sce-
nario where a woman posts a nude picture of her ex-boyfriend, which results
in women appearing at his doorstep to have sex with him. 1°9 Harassment often
depends upon social norms and mores so that the perceptions of the victim are
considered in light of how closely they align with society's views of the ac-
ceptability of the poster's actions. If, for example, someone posts an image of
a woman with the comment, "What a beautiful woman!" the actions of the
poster ordinarily would not be considered harassment even if the individual
perceived the actions as demeaning. In other words, the characterization of an
action as harassment often depends upon society's judgment of the action.
Similarly, the consequences of a harassing post are determined by soci-
ety's judgment of the depicted act. If the victim's sexuality, as depicted in the
posting, does not conform to mainstream or majoritarian social norms, the
consequences are much more severe for the victim. The victim may suffer
ridicule, ostracism, and acts of physical aggression. In other words, the act
must be viewed in societal context. Sexuality harassment is often directed
toward women who do not conform to a certain narrow and constructed ver-
sion of female sexuality. The founder of one gossip website claims that he is
providing a service by holding the women posted on his website accountable
for their actions."0 Postings on that site tend to malign women for their sexual
behavior, the way they dress or for not conforming to certain physical expec-
tations. One posting attacked a woman for "clubbing" and claimed that "she's
now spreading her legs to any guy she meet's [sic] at the bars" and "spreading
107. Although sexuality harassment occurs offline, this article specifically refers to online
sexuality harassment to distinguish it from sexual harassment in the context of employment.
108. Chander observes that "[t]he problem of intrusions with respect to sexual privacy may
be more grave for women than men, for at least two reasons. First, society has long allowed men
greater latitude in sexual affairs than it affords women .... Second, women are more likely to be
the subject of nude photographs." Chander, supra note 11, at 129.
109. Danielle Keats Citron notes that the harassment of women online is a "pernicious and
widespread problem" and has a "profound effect on targeted women" that causes significant harm.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108
MICH. L. REv. 373, 374-75 (2009).
110. See Engstrom, supra note 89.
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her legs like the slut she is."' l The online stone throwing continues in the
comments with statements such as "[I] hate this bitch!"'1 12 "Is this a man or a
woman? Can't tell the difference." ' 1 3 And "E.T. go home your [sic] dirty trash
bag!""l4 And "this one is a major dirty whoremaster!! !' 115 Another user posted
photos of a woman, calling her the "most disgusting girl in the state of Kan-
sas" and a "fat cow."' 16 On one section of the site, posters upload photos seek-
ing the website operator's opinion on the subject women, which is almost
always negative. For example, under one posted photo, the website operator
comments that a woman's "inner thighs clap, she has some extra muscles
below her pits which she only photoshopped on one side of the bottom pic...
that's also not her hip she's holding onto, its [sic] an over-sized muffin top."'"17
One possible, albeit incomplete, solution to online sexuality harassment is
to mandate that images of nude individuals that have been posted without the
authorization of the subjects be removed upon their request. In response to
concerns about vagueness, nudity should be defined as images of an indi-
vidual's genitalia or buttocks, and images of a female subject's breasts, where
the subject individual is identifiable. Such images are likely to be invasive of
privacy. "8 Even where the subjects consented to the taking of the photographs
in a particular context, they may not have consented to the online posting of
the photographs.' 
19
As an example, someone may consent to the taking of nude pictures
within the context of a relationship. After the relationship ends, a vindictive
ex-lover may post the photograph online as an act of revenge. Ann Bartow
notes that amateur pornography may include "fairly transparently an effort to
disgrace or damage the subject of the pornography. 'Revenge' pornography
appears to be a widespread phenomenon, very popular with pornography
viewers attracted by the eroticization of acts of targeted personal humilia-
S11. Winnipeg's Trashiest Sloot, THEDiRTY (Mar. 22, 2011), http://thedirty.com/2011/03/
winnipegs-trashiest-sloot. From the comments, it seems as the posting was fabricated by someone
who had a dispute with the victim of the post over money: "haha stop posting these Karolina... I
can't believe you have the nerve to call Jill a slut and whore but now a thief! Lol she is lucky to
have money something that you haver [sic] ZERO of which I why you stole from her!! There is a
police report for theft against Karolina from her landlord that she stole from as Well as Jill. Jill!
love you babe and please do something about this bitch screwing with your life she needs to stop
now." Anonymous, Winnipeg's Trashiest Sloot, THEDIRTY (Mar. 23, 2011, 10:57 AM).
112. Anonymous, Winnipeg's Trashiest Sloot, THEDIRTY (Apr. 8,2011, 10:51 AM).
113. A.N., Winnipeg's Trashiest Sloot, THEDiRTY (Mar. 22, 2011,9:12 AM).
114. Anonymous, Winnipeg's Trashiest Sloot, THEDIRTY (Mar. 22, 2011, 12:36 PM).
115. Anonymous, Winnipeg's Trashiest Sloot, THEDIRTY (May 2, 2011, 8:28 PM).
116. Anonymous, Fat Cow Alert, THEDIRTY, http://thedirty.com/2011/02/fat-cow-alert-3/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
117. Anonymous, Would You?, THEDIRTY, http://thedirty.comcategory/would-you/ (last
visited Aug. 29, 2012).
118. There are generally four types of privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff s seclu-
sion or into his private affairs, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plain-
tiff, (3) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light, and (4) appropriation for the defendant's
advance of the plaintiff's name or likeness. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,
389 (1960).
119. See Nissenbaum, supra note 16, at 138 (arguing that the "benchmark of privacy is
contextual integrity").
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tion." 120 Even if taken in a public place, the nudity may have been highly con-
text specific, such as at a nude beach or campground. Given the highly
personal nature of such photographs, immediate removal upon request of the
subject is warranted. 121
The takedown policy regarding nude images should apply even where the
subject is a public figure. For example, former Congressman Anthony Weiner
was the subject of a highly publicized scandal when he inadvertently publicly
distributed a lewd photograph of himself, via Twitter. Subsequently, a blogger
released another image, this one of Weiner's penis, which the Congressman
had e-mailed to a woman with whom he had been corresponding. The image
was distributed on the Internet and eventually resulted in Weiner's resignation.
While the initial image was newsworthy, the publication of the image of
Weiner's erect penis crosses the line of decency and the public's "need to
know." There is no justifiable reason for its release online. As indiscriminate
as Weiner might have been about shooting and sending digital images from his
computer, he clearly never intended the public to see a body part that is clearly
private. Weiner's online activity may be news, but the actual photograph of his
penis should not be. While written descriptions of nude images are likely rea-
sonable and legal, the actual image of a man's erect penis in this context is
simply pornographic and exploitative. Even public figures should be able to
maintain a shred of privacy.
c. Websites Should Take Down Unauthorized Images of Minors
Upon Request of Legal Guardian.
While many images of nonpublic figure minors are not as invasive of
privacy as nude images, a reasonable cyber harassment policy should include
the removal of images of identifiable minors upon request of their legal
guardian. Minors are more impulsive and prone to peer pressure. They may
post suggestive or revealing images without fully realizing the harmful effects
of posting said images.122 A picture of a minor in underwear or a bathing suit,
for example, may attract the attention of sexual predators or the ridicule of
peers. Studies indicate that the impulsivity exhibited by teenagers has a bio-
logical basis.123 In an article reviewing some of these recent studies, Dr. Sarah-
Jane Blakemore noted that one study suggests that "both emotion processing
120. Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 799, 813 (2008).
121. See Matthew R. Porio, Off-Guard and Online: The Unwitting Video Stars of the Web
and the Public Disclosure Tort, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 339, 367 (2008) (discussing
an online video of a college student catching his roommate masturbating).
122. Recent studies indicate that adolescents may not fully comprehend how personal infor-
mation can be used in unintended ways. For a summary of the recent literature in this area, see
Alice E. Marwick et al., Youth Privacy and Reputation (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10-29, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1588163.
123. See generally Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Development of the Social Brain During
Adolescence, 61 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 40 (2008) (summarizing recent studies investi-
gating social cognitive development during adolescence).
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and cognitive appraisal systems develop during adolescence."' 2 4 Another study
suggests that certain neural changes occur during adolescence that may affect
decision making'
25
Given their peer group, it is not surprising that minors are more likely to
be the subject of cyberbullying. Children have created false Facebook profiles
and sent e-mails and texts masquerading as their classmates. One mother, for
example, reported finding a Facebookpage with a photo of her son, along with
comments harassing his classmates.' 2 After investigating the matter, she dis-
covered that several of her son's classmates had created a false account in her
son's name and used misappropriated photos.'
27
A child may become the victim of cyberbullying merely for expressing
himself privately.' 28 In one well-known example, a teenage boy recorded him-
self on video wielding a golf ball retriever like a warrior from a Star Wars
movie.12 9 The video was discovered by his high school classmates who posted
it to a file sharing website. The video spread virally and was viewed millions
of times.' 30 Even today, several years after the video was first disseminated,
videos of the "Star Wars Kid" may be easily found online, accompanied by
hostile and abusive remarks. A recent visit to YouTube, found the following
comments: "fat fucking virgin," "asshole," "I think he's mentally retarded,"
"lol wtf was that faget [sic]," "you look like an [sic] fat dancer ho [sic] has
dislexia [sic]," and "this video makes me want to kick this kids [sic] ass. Seri-
ously.'" 31 This boy's private act of expression became the object of global
scorn and ridicule (as well as near-criminal misspellings and cheap psycho-
analysis). 132
While any sentient human being would find this type of abuse unpleasant,
children and adolescents are at a critical period of social and emotional devel-
opment. Minors do not yet have the maturity or the social experience to con-
124. Id. at 46.
125. Id. "[T]he neural strategy for thinking about intentions changes between adolescence
and adulthood. Although the same neural network is active, the relative roles of the different areas
change, with activity moving from anterior (medial prefrontal) regions to posterior (temporal)
regions with age." Id.
126. Jan Hoffman, As Bullies Go Digital, Parents Play Catch-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010,
at A].
127. Id.
128. ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE 4 (2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/ISTTFFinal Report-ExecutiveSummary.pdf (reporting
that cyberbullying is a greater threat to teens than sexual predation).
129. Jessica Bennett, The Flip Side of Internet Fame; In an Age of Google and YouTube,
Public Shaming Can Turn Anybody into a Celebrity--or a Fool, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2008,
7:00pm), http://www.thedailybeast.con/newsweek/2008/02/21/the-flip-side-of-internet-fame.html.
130. Id.
131. Star Wars Kid, YoUTUBE (Jan. 15, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HPPj6vilBmU. These postings are a sampling of the many visible on Aug. 29, 2012.
132. According to a lawsuit filed against the classmates who posted the video, the video
"may cause [the boy] to be labeled as 'mentally ill' and the stigma could make it difficult for him
to enroll in school or get a job, and may force him to change his name." Star Wars Kid Files
Lawsuit, WIRED NEWS REPORT (July 24, 2003), http://www.wired.com/culturelifestyle/news/
2003/07/59757.
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textualize public humiliation.' 33 The "Star Wars kid," for example, dropped
out of school and enrolled in a children's psychiatric ward.
134
Furthermore, minors have not yet developed a professional reputation to
offset or counter the effect of embarrassing or otherwise negative posted im-
ages, which may hinder their future career opportunities. 135 Some critics may
charge that websites will be barraged with overprotective parents seeking
removal of harmless photographs of their children. It's more likely that parents
will complain only if they feel that the images of their children are being mis-
used, which they often are in disturbing ways.' 36 A researcher, for example,
reports that an image of one child's head was put on a pornographic picture
depicting a sexual act. 37 Many of that child's classmates were directed to the
online image.'
38
Furthermore, a "takedown-upon-notice" regime might prevent more ag-
gressive action. Recently, a couple called the police to have a man arrested for
posting a video of their eight-year-old son spewing profanity. 139 While the
man claimed that he would have removed the clip if the parents had asked, it is
understandable why the parents might not have been anxious to interact with a
neighbor whom they felt compromised the morals of their son by allegedly
encouraging him to swear for $1 and then posting the video online. 140 (The
man denied both encouraging the boy to swear and paying the boy money). 141
Given the impossibility of ubiquitous parental supervision and lack of control
over the taking of digital images of their children, the powerlessness of chil-
dren to prevent adults from taking their picture, and the substantial interest that
parents have in the safety and well being of their children, websites should
defer to parental judgment. 142
133. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Ted Brodheim, the chief information
officer for the New York City Department of Education, observed, "I don't think they [high school
students] fully grasp that when they make some of these decisions, it's not something they can pull
back from." Stephanie Clifford, Teaching About the Web, and Its Troublesome Parts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2010, at A15.
134. Samuel Axon, "The Star Wars Kid": Where Is He Now?, MASHABLE ENTERTAINMENT
(June 3, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/06/03/star-wars-kid/. The "Star Wars kid" is currently a
law student and president of a nonprofit dedicated to preserving the heritage and culture of a
French Canadian town. Id.
135. The poster's reputation may be negatively affected, too if her identity is revealed.
136. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding online posting of children's photo-
graphs, see Douglas Quenquo, Guardians of Their Smiles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at STI.
137. Paul J. Fink, The Case of a Teenager Who Committed Suicide After Being Bullied
Online Shows that the Internet Can Be a Weapon Against the Psychiatrically Vulnerable. What




139. Everton Bailey, Jr., YouTube Star's Mother Didn't Find Video Funny, COLUMBUS




142. See also Chander, supra note 11, 124-39 (discussing why a reinvigorated privacy tort is
necessary to protect youthful indiscretion). Chander's thoughtful essay explains why the Internet
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d. Websites Should (Usually) Take Down Private Communication
Upon Request of the Writer
The third-party posting behavior has resulted in an unfortunate but com-
mon scenario where communications intended to be private are instead for-
warded or posted without the writer's consent. A website that permits users to
post content should be prepared to address what to do when a user posts pri-
vate communication from a third party. E-mails are often written quickly and
have a different style and purpose than communications intended for a general
audience. Furthermore, e-mail communications are typically written using a
language, style and references that have meaning only within the contextual
framework of a preexisting relationship between the sender and the receiver. A
study by the Pew Research Center found that the most common type of
cyberbullying among teenagers was the forwarding or public posting of private
communication without permission. 143 Nearly 1 in 6 teens reported having had
someone forward or post private communication.14
In some cases, an intermediary may believe that the public posting of
private communication serves a valid public purpose. In that case, the website
operator's actions should be subject to a reasonableness analysis. In other
words, a decision by the website operator not to remove private third-party
communications does not necessarily mean that the website operator has acted
in an unreasonable or tortious manner. It does mean that the third party may be
able to pursue a tort or copyright action against the website operator. It does
not mean that the third party will prevail. Furthermore, the possibility of a
lawsuit by a third party is mitigated by the availability of the safe harbors set
forth in Part III.
e. A Website's Cyber Harassment Policy Must Implement
a Reasonable Review Policy
Finally, a cyber harassment policy should have a reasonable review pro-
cess in place. Any site that permits user-generated content should expect
takedown requests and should be prepared to deal with them. A review process
does not mean that the website operator must comply with the takedown re-
quest, only that the review process should be timely and reasonable. One web-
site allegedly entertains takedown requests with the intent of publicizing them
for ridicule or "lulz."' 14 5 That, of course, would not constitute a reasonable
review process.
and online disclosures threaten to force children to live their lives "as if in a fishbowl," which may
lead to youth adopting the "unfortunate strategies" of "excessive caution or foolhardy fearless-
ness." Id. at 124-25.
143. AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, CYBERBULLYING AND
ONLINE TEENS 2 (2007), available at http://pewinternet.org/l-/medial/Files/Reports/2007/PIP%
20Cyberbullying%20Memo.pdf.pdf. The survey was based on responses from 935 teenagers. Id.
144. Id.
145. Lulz is a term that refers to the gratification of causing suffering to others through
online activity. See LANIER, supra note 23, at 61 ("The culture of sadism online has its own vo-
cabulary and has gone mainstream. The common term 'lulz,' for instance, refers to the gratifica-
tion of watching others suffer over the cloud.") Id. See also Mattathias Schwartz, The Trolls
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Some websites exploit web design and section 230 immunity, appealing to
its audience's worst instincts. Gossip and voyeurism generate traffic and in-
crease visibility, which may lead to more advertising revenue or notoriety that
a website operator can parlay into other revenue generating opportunities.1
4 6
On the other hand, many websites strive for a broad user base and a more
congenial environment. Under a website proprietorship standard, courts would
be able to make distinctions between and among different types of websites.
III. LIABILITY SAFE HARBORS
This article advocates the imposition of website proprietorship liability
primarily because websites are generally in the best position to respond to
harmful postings. Website operators are usually the only parties technically
able to remove posts. Because postings are often anonymous, the victim of a
harmful post may not be able to seek redress from the poster. Websites have
the ability to profit from traffic on their site. Throughout this article, the terms
businesses and proprietors are used deliberately in describing website opera-
tors. Website operators have the option of profiting financially from their web-
sites. More page views and a larger user base mean the potential for greater
advertising revenue.
Yet, there are some instances where imposing website proprietorship
liability on a website operator may be unfair or unwarranted. The threat of
liability may stifle fledgling businesses. Some businesses may serve as quasi-
public forums and enable users to virtually gather and discuss newsworthy
issues. Given the lack of public forums on the Internet, these websites serve a
socially beneficial function. The threat of liability may cause these quasi-
public forums to disappear.
There are two primary arguments in favor of retaining section 230 im-
munity. The first is that it encourages innovation, economic growth, and the
flourishing of the Internet. The second argument is that it protects free speech
online. Both types of arguments are discussed more fully in Part IV.
While a social harm does not always justify a remedy that removes or
diminishes associated benefits, neither does a social benefit justify resultant or
associated social harms. This article proposes that one way to balance the
benefits of section 230 with its burdens is to impose proprietorship liability yet
create safe harbors. As discussed in Part I.A., courts should interpret the lan-
guage of section 230 to permit website proprietorship liability. Unfortunately,
they have not. Given that the language of section 230(c)(1) regarding the
treatment of websites as "publisher or speaker" has only generated confusion
Among Us, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at MM24 (Lulz means "the joy of disrupting another's
emotional equilibrium.").
146. The use of images to increase traffic may create a right of publicity claim on the part of
the individual whose image has been misappropriated. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A
Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1345, 1345-46 (2009) (noting that the "right of publicity is a legal theory that enables individuals
to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of their personas," but the
"reality is that many actions based on the unauthorized use of personas involve both dignity and
economic harms").
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and provides little guidance, this article proposes eliminating this terminology
and replacing it with safe harbor provisions that balance the benefits and bur-
dens of proprietorship liability. A website operator that falls under any one of
these safe harbors would be deemed to have acted "reasonably." These safe
harbors would effectively immunize a website operator from proprietorship
liability. Part III.D proposes legislative language to amend section 230 to re-
flect both proprietorship liability and the safe harbors.
A. Identified Postings and Takedown Compliance
Websites that require that all posting be by identified users would fall
under a safe harbor. Posters would put their real name alongside the post and
their contact information would be kept on file with the website. Many of the
problems of online discourse stem from the lack of ownership of posted con-
tent. Postings are often made anonymous or pseudonymously. Jaron Lanier
calls "effortless, consequence-free, transient anonymity" 147 or "drive-by ano-
nymity" 14 8 an important design feature of a "troll-evoking" website.1
49
There are undoubtedly benefits to anonymity. Yet, these benefits must be
carefully weighed against the harms that are currently being done by the many
who exploit the privilege of anonymity. In a recent letter to the editor of the
New York Times, Catherine Crump of the American Civil Liberties Union
argued for the preservation of online anonymity by urging: "[T]hink about
your younger self, and whether you'd want everything you said as a teenager
to be permanently linked to your real name."' 150 Yet, the names of many chil-
dren and young adults are being permanently linked to posts written by anon-
ymous others, who are free to say what they want about others without
revealing their own identities.
These anonymous posters are often goaded by websites that encourage the
two regrettable behaviors. As noted in Part II, some websites tout the ease with
which postings may be made by unidentified sources, inciting defamatory or
malicious postings. Even those sites that require registration before posting
typically do not identify the user but maintain the user's registration infor-
mation solely for their own internal marketing purposes. Without responsi-
bility for content, posters and intermediaries abandon discretion. Victims are
left without recourse because posters may be difficult to identify and locate,
and intermediaries are immune under section 230. A policy of requiring post-
ers to be publicly identified with their postings may reduce the incidence of
both impulsive and third-party posting, and their negative consequences. One
notable company has already recognized the potential benefits of identified
postings in fostering a desirable culture.'15 The new social networking site,
147. LANIER, supra note 23, at 63.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Catherine Crump, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TMES (Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/1 1/27/opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-anonymity-and-incivility-on-the-intemet.htnl?
pagewanted=all.
151. GOOGLE+, http://www.google.con/+ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
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Google+, requires the use of "real names." 152 The "real names" policy, which
does not mean legal names, requires that users employ common names or
names that they use in everyday life on their Google+ profile. 53 Google's
stated reason for this policy is to have a "nicer, more personal, community."'
54
Currently, an anonymous poster can publicly ruin a victim's reputation
with no association whatsoever with the act. Identified postings would asso-
ciate posters with the nature of their postings, thus more closely mirroring the
consequences of spreading gossip in the offline world. 155 The posting may lose
credibility depending upon the reliability of the poster. Furthermore, the
poster, not just the subject of the post, would suffer from a malicious post.
For example, an individual who posts intimate photographs or information
about a former lover becomes associated with the act of betrayal, thereby di-
minishing her chances at future relationships. An increase in the social conse-
quences of spreading harmful information might deter would-be malicious
posters as well as provide an alternative to the legal system. As previously
noted, the legal system with its focus on remedying rather than preventing
harms, often leaves victims of online harassment without a satisfying remedy.
Identified postings may enable the victim to bypass the legal system by using
social pressure to persuade the poster to remove an offensive post. Thus, the
victim would have the option of pursuing a civil action directly against the
poster or of using social pressure to persuade the poster to seek removal of the
harmful content.
It may be difficult for website operators to verify that a given name and
contact information is genuine. The standard for verifying real names should
be the listing of a first and last name and the retention by the website operator
of contact information. In the event that a complaining party discovers that the
given name and contact information of a poster is fake, the website operator
must remove the posting if it is to continue to avail itself of this safe harbor. If
the website operator removes the posting after discovery that the identity is
false, it is immune from liability.
Furthermore, to qualify for this safe harbor, the website operator claiming
immunity must promptly remove any content upon request by the original
poster. Any expressive interest that the website operator might have in content
posted by another should be subordinate to the interests of the poster, espe-
cially given that section 230 relieves the website operator from liability. Un-
fortunately, some website operators exploit section 230 immunity and take
advantage of the two unfortunate behaviors by refusing to remove content
152. Rob D. Young, Google+ Takes No-Nonsense Policy on User Identity & Community
Standards, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (July 22, 2011), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2095939/
Google-Takes-No-Nonsense-Policy-on-User-Identity-Community-Standards (discussing Google's
policy on its Google+ network of banning accounts that seem to be using fake names).
153. Id.
154. Robert Scobel, I Talked with Google VP, GOOGLE+ (July 25, 2011), https://plus.
google.com/1 11091089527727420853/posts/Fddn6rV8mBX#l 11091089527727420853/posts/Fdd
n6rV8mBX.
155. Daniel Solove notes that, by gossiping, a person may risk harm to her own reputation.
SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 140-42.
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even where requested by the poster. For example, one consumer review web-
site claims that it provides "a service to the world's consumers."'1 56 This web-
site, Ripoff Report, states that it helps consumers "exercise your first
amendment right to freedom of speech. By using our forum, you will have an
opportunity to speak out against companies, businesses, government and indi-
viduals that have treated you unfairly."15 7 It notes, however, that it will not
remove posts by users "even if the original author asks us to do so. ' 58 Yet, on
at the bottom of the web page, this same website notes that "it wants to be
clear that it accepts no liability for the speech of its users"' 59 and that the CDA
prohibits a defamed subject "from holding us liable for the statements which
others have written. ' 6 It throws its posters under the bus, adding, "You can
always sue the author if you want, but you can't sue Ripoff Report just be-
cause we provide a forum for speech."'
161
While one could make a strong argument that a company that seeks to
provide a forum for the benefit of the public should have limited immunity, it
would not qualify for this particular safe harbor.' 62 A website's policy that
absolutely refuses to remove content upon poster request fails to consider the
realities of the two unfortunate behaviors, and ignores that a user may post in
an emotional state that she later regrets. It also disempowers the poster and
strips the value of autonomous decision making from the act of expression.
Finally, it leaves the poster vulnerable to lawsuits. The website shares none of
the responsibility for the post yet maintains total control over its continued
publication, exacerbating harms for which the poster may ultimately be liable.
B. Takedown upon Notice-Right of Reply and Poster Identification
A website operator that receives a notice requesting the removal of con-
tent would be exempt from liability if it promptly complies with the request. A
notice and takedown regime under section 230 would be consistent with other
regulatory regimes, such as the Directive issued by the European Parlia-163
ment, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),'64 and has been
proposed by other critics of section 230.165 Daniel Solove, for example, pro-
poses that section 230 be modified so that
156. Frequently Asked Questions, RIPOFF REPORT, http://www.ripoffreport.com/faq.aspx
(last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
157. Id.
158. About Us: Want to Sue Ripoff Report?, RIPOFF REPORT, http://www.ripoffreport.com/




162. It may, however, fall under the "nonprofit" safe harbor discussed in Part m11.
163. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14-15, 2000 O.J. (L 178); see generally
THIBAULT VERBIEST ET AL., STUDY ON THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES (2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/e-commerce/docs/study/iabifity/final-report-en.
pdf.
164. 12 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (2006).
165. See generally Daniel Solove, Speech, Privacy and Reputation on the Internet, in THE
OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 25 (Saul Levmore & Martha C.
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[w]henever bloggers or website operators know that a comment posted by
another is tortious, the law should create an incentive for them to remove it.
If a person promptly removes a tortious comment after being notified, then
that person would be immune. If the person fails to remove the comment,
only then would the person be subjected to potential liability. 166
The provision could be modeled after the DMCA provision regarding notice
and takedown of allegedly infringing copyrighted material. Some critics argue
that the DMCA takedown provision has been abused by copyright owners who
use it to remove lawfully posted material and that such a provision under sec-
tion 230 would be similarly abused. 167 Daniel Solove tackles such criticisms,
noting that while the DMCA is "fraught with problems, as zealous copyright
owners are making overbroad takedown requests for material that is fair
use, ' 168 a similar provision under section 230 is unlikely to be abused in that
way:
Would notice and takedown for defamatory or privacy-invasive speech run
into similar problems? I do not believe it would for several reasons. First,
abusing the notice-and-takedown system should be penalized. Those who
wrongly issue takedown threats for material that is not defamatory or inva-
sive of privacy should be punished for making unjustified claims. Second, the
entities enforcing copyright law are often very wealthy, powerful and aggres-
sive .... In contract, most privacy or defamation plaintiffs are ordinary indi-
viduals, without the ability to hire armies of lawyers or to pursue cases
relentlessly to the four comers of the globe. Most individuals who request in-
formation be taken down to protect their personal reputations lack the liti-
gating power of the music or movie industry, and the stakes are much
lower. 9
Solove acknowledges that there is the possibility of excessive takedown
and predatory lawsuits that aim to extort money. 170 In response to predatory
lawsuits, he proposes mandatory mediation and limits on damages. 71 Solove's
response to the risk of excessive takedown, however, is less definitive. He
states that "[1]essening §230 immunity is unlikely to increase the existing risk
of excessive takedown in a dramatic fashion."' 12 But, Solove acknowledges
that there are unanswered empirical questions regarding the impact of a
Nussbaum eds., 2010) (recommending that section 230 be modified to have a notice-and-
takedown system rather than complete immunity); Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies
Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41 (2007), available at http://
thepocketpart.org/2007/09/08areheart.html (proposing a notice-and-take-down scheme similar to
that available under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 19, at
388 (arguing "that Congress should amend § 230 to reimpose a regime modeled on the common
law's 'distributor with knowledge' principle.").
166. Solove, supra note 165, at 25.
167. Id. at 25-26.
168. Id. at 25.





takedown regime upon legitimate speech and that the "only way to find out for
certain is to experiment."'
' 73
Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig propose a more concrete notice and
takedown regime that addresses the potential problem of frivolous claims.
Their proposal would give content creators the right to a federal court hearing
to reverse unjustified takedown notices, and would impose penalties upon
those making bad faith takedown demands. 1
74
Some free speech advocates may find notice and takedown or notice-
takedown-put back proposals unsatisfying, especially given the lack of public
forums on the Internet and the cultural primacy placed upon freedom of speech
in American society. Given the large amount of content on some websites,
some argue that any notice and takedown regime places too great a burden on
intermediaries to respond.
Notwithstanding these valid concerns, blanket immunity places too great a
burden upon victims of online harassment. In an attempt to recalibrate the
speech-privacy balance, this article proposes a notice-takedown scheme with a
twist-a response-and-identification safe harbor. Upon receiving a takedown
notice, the website operator may notify the poster and the poster may elect to
stand by the posting by identifying herself. The posting would then become an
"identified" posting and the website operator would be immune from civil
liability.
The benefit of this safe harbor is that it shifts the burden of assessing con-
tent upon the poster. It forces the content creator-and not the intermediary-
to make the sometimes difficult determination whether content is lawful.
There is no incentive for the intermediary to remove content merely to avoid
the possibility of a lawsuit. Rather, it is the content creator who must make the
determination whether continued publication is worth the risk of being sued.
Thus the risk of unlawful speech remains where it should be-with the
speaker.
C. Nonprofit Companies with No Site Advertising
In some cases, a website may hold itself out to be a quasi-public forum,
claiming that it serves a valuable social function by providing a virtual space
to debate issues of public concern. The motivations of companies, however,
may not be entirely pure. The argument about wishing to serve as a public
forum sounds disingenuous where the site discussions primarily involve pri-
vate figures and where the site profits from page views 175 or where the website
173. Id. at 26-27.
174. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 19, at 401.
175. On a related issue about the dichotomous nature of intermediaries, Rob Frieden point-
edly observes that ISPs "toggle between claiming First Amendment-protected speaker rights and
invoking 'safe harbor' exemptions from liability for the content they carry .... ISPs seemingly can
turn on and off their speaker status to qualify for two different types of limits on government
regulation of the content they deliver." Frieden, supra note 73, at 1281-82.
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charges a fee to provide services to "arbitrate" disputed postings. 176 A com-
pany may claim to serve a public forum function and make money doing so,
but in that case, it should be willing to accept ordinary business risks, in-
cluding the risks of proprietorship liability. This third safe harbor would pro-
tect those intermediaries that are organized as nonprofits so long as they do not
accept paid advertisements on their sites. This safe harbor distinguishes be-
tween those sites that serve public forum functions, and those which merely
employ such rhetoric while running for-profit businesses.
D. Proposed Legislative Amendment
As previously discussed, section 230 of the CDA has been misinterpreted
by courts to grant broad immunity to intermediaries. There is nothing in the
statutory language that grants immunity to intermediaries. Furthermore, the
only exculpatory language in the legislation is with regard to good faith efforts
to remove or restrict access to objectionable material. Section 230(c)(1)
merely defines the status of intermediaries in the negative; it does not explain
what a publisher or speaker is, or in what context it would be appropriate to
make such distinctions. The uncertain purpose of section 230(c)(1) is largely
responsible for the judicial missteps with section 230 cases. Courts seem to
have conflated the exculpatory language regarding good faith removal and
restriction efforts in section 230(c)(2) with the language about not treating
intermediaries as publishers or speakers in section 230(c)(1), to perversely
grant broad immunity to websites because they are publishers of content.
Given the judicial madness created by subsection (1), this article proposes that
it be deleted and replaced with provisions that provide for targeted instances of
immunity. To reflect these proposed safe harbors, and to clarify the imposition
of civil liability, the language of section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act should be amended as follows:
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher r fspe-er
N O pfrovidoFr orf useor of An inite-ractive etemputer ser.'iee shall be
troat d as the publih ar speaker ef any information prOVided b!'
another ifoai n *otn r~ider.
(21) Civil and criminal liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of -
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected;
or
176. Ripoff Report, for example, provides a "V.I.P. Arbitration process" whereby a com-
plaining party may seek to have a false statement redacted. About Us: Want to Sue RipoffReport?,
supra note 158. The program is not free, however, as the site notes "there is a cost for participating
in the program which covers the arbitrator's fees and our administrative costs, but the program is
not expensive compared with other alternatives." Id.
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(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (A)
(C) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the civil or
criminal liability of an interactive computer service provider or user
except that:
i. no interactive computer service provider shall be liable for content
provided by another information content provider if -
1. upon notice of the content by a complaining party, the interactive
computer service provider acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the content or, alternatively, identifies the information
content provider with information sufficient to permit the
complaining party to contact the information content provider (such
as an address, telephone number and an electronic mail address)
and provided further that the website operator expeditiously
removes content if so requested by the information content
provider;
2. all content posted on a website by information content providers are
accompanied with a first and last name identifying the information
content providers, and provided further that upon request by a
complaining party, the website operator identifies the information
content provider with information sufficient to permit the
complaining party to contact the information content provider (such
as an address, telephone number and an electronic mail address)
and provided further that: (i) the website operator expeditiously
removes the content upon request of the information content
provider; and (ii) the website operator expeditiously removes the
content if the name or contact information of the information
content provider is false or unverifiable; or
3. the interactive computer service provider is a non-profit entity
which does not earn any revenue or receive any monies from
advertising on the website where the content that is the subject of a
complaint is posted.
(e) Effect on other laws
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State civil or criminal law that is consistent with this
section. Nc eause of action may be brught and no liability may be




The term "website operator" means any person or entity,
including any interactive computer service, that manages and has
the ability to control the content on a website.
(6) website
The term "website" means a location on the Internet indicated
by a Uniform Resource Locator or "URL."
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IV. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS
Opponents to these proposals will likely respond in one of two ways. The
first category of argument has to do with Internet growth and business innova-
tion. The second category involves free speech. Both of these objectives are
reflected in the policy goals of the CDA. In addition, this Part briefly ad-
dresses arguments that the aforementioned proposals do not go far enough to
address online harms.
A. Business Arguments in Favor of Section 230
One argument in favor of section 230 immunity is that it promotes tech-
nological innovation and the growth of online businesses. 177 According to this
view, the specter of tort liability for intermediaries would have a chilling effect
on Internet businesses and innovation. 178 This article expresses skepticism that
the threat of liability is likely to significantly hinder the growth of the Internet
and the author is unaware of any empirical studies to support this often re-
peated claim. It is still much less costly to start a business online than it is to
open a store or publish a book or magazine. The low costs of opening an
online business (compared to the costs of opening a business that requires
occupying physical property) and the increasing fluidity between online and
offline transactions ensures that companies will continue to conjure up inno-
vative online businesses. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remarked in a
footnote in the Roommates case, "[c]ompliance with laws of general applica-
bility seems like an entirely justified burden for all businesses, whether they
operate online or through quaint brick-and-mortar facilities."' 79 It further re-
marked that the vast reach of the Internet is "exactly why we must be careful
not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give
online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts,
which must comply with laws of general applicability."' 180 In a world where
177. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, How 47 USC 230 Improves Marketplace Efficiency,
TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Mar. 15, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2011/03/how 47 usc 230.htm; Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service
Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 583, 616 (2008) (noting that while it is unclear to what extent whether section 230 immunity
assisted the development of Web 2.0, it poses less hurdles to it than alternatives).
178. Alex Kozinski and Josh Goldfoot recently wrote:
[T]he "argument that a legal holding will bring the [l]ntemet to a standstill makes most judges lis-
ten closely .... No one in a black robe wants to be responsible for anything like that ... Closely
related is the argument that, even if you don't bring down the existing structure, the threat of lia-
bility will stifle innovation, so that the progress we have seen in recent years-and the gains in
productivity and personal satisfaction-will stop because the legal structure has made innovation
too risky or expensive.
Alex Kozinski & Josh Goldfoot, A Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 365, 370 (2009). One of the authors, Alex Kozinski, is the chief judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The authors conclude that the innovation argument
is "partly right, but mostly wrong." Id.
179. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157,
1169 n.24 (9th Cir. 2008).
180. Id. at 1164-65 n.15.
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print magazine and newspaper subscriber bases and advertising revenues are
being siphoned away by online publishers, an immunity for online publishers
that is unavailable for offline ones is simply discriminatory and unfair.
There is a tendency to refer to Internet companies as a singular type when,
as this article has explained, there are a wide variety of business models, prac-
tices and policies. All businesses are not good for society, and all Internet
companies are not innovative. Websites that encourage defamatory content or
content that invades the privacy of private citizens do so in contravention of
society's values. Of course, there may be websites that would be threatened by
reducing the scope of section 230 immunity. Many consumer review websites,
for example, might disappear or be forced to change their submissions poli-
cies.181
The disappearance of these websites would not be tragic or notable. Com-
panies have always had to assess risks, including the risks of litigation, with
the potential upside of engaging in business. The extremely low barriers to
entry have changed the typical Darwinian process of survival represented by a
free market system. The result is more and more unreliable consumer review
websites and an increasing scarcity of quality reporting. Readers of a tradi-
tional publication, such as the New York Times, are often familiar with a par-
ticular reviewer's tastes and preferences. They trust that reviewer, even if they
do not agree with that reviewer's opinion. They know, in other words, where
that reviewer is coming from. It is a different story with online review sites.
The consumer searching for a recommendation is barraged with information,
forced to sift through the offerings of many review websites and to assess the
reliability of the often wildly diverging reviews without knowing where the
reviewers are coming from or whether their tastes and preferences align with
the consumer. The reviews may be disingenuous or dishonest.' 82 Some of the
negative reviews may be the result of vengeful and petty customers or com-
petitors, and some of the positive reviews may be from company employees.
The reduction of online consumer review sites may prove beneficial for con-
sumers who already suffer from information overload. Companies may insti-
tute more rigorous review policies or may establish themselves in ways to
qualify for a safe harbor provision. Far from sounding a death knell for con-
sumer review sites, imposition of proprietorship liability may result in a de-
crease in their quantity but an increase in their quality, reliability, and
usefulness. 183
181. Eric Goldman credits section 230 with enabling the proliferation of consumer review
publications. Goldman, supra note 177. He notes that "47 USC 230's immunity enables consumer
review websites," which help "consumers make better marketplace decisions." Id.
182. Eric Felten, Lawsuits Fly Over Mean Online Reviews, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2010, at
W11 (remarking that "even the most cursory perusal of online comments that rate products and
services also discovers plenty of manufactured praise and malicious trash-talk"). Not surprisingly,
many people "question the honesty of online critiques." Id.
183. David Segal, the consumer advocate columnist writing The Haggler for the New York
Times, recently wrote about the problem of fake reviews on consumer review websites such as
Yelp where businesses can pay to have someone post a favorable review about their company.
David Segal, A Rave, a Pan, or Just a Fake? N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 2011, at BU7. In another col-
52 JURIMETRICS
Website Design and Liability
Eric Goldman has referred to section 230 as reflecting an "Internet
exceptionalist" view because it "treats online providers more favorably than
offline publishers--even when they publish identical content."' 84 Internet
exceptionalists believe that cyberspace is different from real space and that
different rules and principles should apply.' 85 The Internet exceptionalist view
exhibits an unfortunate tendency to refer to technology and innovation as
characteristics specific to Internet-based businesses.' 86 Yet, technology does
not happen only or even primarily online. There are many businesses that are
working on products and services to improve human lives. 187 Pharmaceutical
companies are working on drugs to prevent cancer or alleviate pain. Clean
technology companies are searching for alternative fuel sources and re-
searching ways to reduce carbon emissions. Yet, these companies do not bene-
fit from broad immunity for their actions. Online consumer review sites such
as Yelp should not receive immunity from tort liability when more socially
beneficial companies (for example, a biotech start-up working on a treatment
for Alzheimer' s disease) do not. If a few would-be online entrepreneurs decide
to pursue alternative career paths because of the fear of tort liability, our so-
ciety will survive. In fact, it may even flourish. For-profit businesses have
never been, and should never be, risk-free. As Chief Judge of the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Alex Kozinski, and his coauthor, Josh
Goldfoot, write:
[P]romoting innovation alone cannot be a sufficient justification for exempt-
ing innovators form the law. An unfortunate result of our complex legal sys-
tem is that almost everyone is confused about what the law means, and
everyone engaged in a business of any complexity at some point has to con-
sult a lawyer. If the need to obey the law stifles innovation, that stifling is just
another cost of having a society ruled by law. 1
88
Companies have always engaged in a calculated analysis of the costs and
benefits of engaging in a particular type of business, Section 230 immunity
umn, Segal noted that one review site, Transport Reviews, generates revenues from transport com-
panies, which can buy advertisement and a higher profile on the site. The website also permits
companies to post the last response to any negative review. David Segal, Sure, Post A Review. But
the Last Word Won't Be Yours, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2011, at BU8.
184. Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, TECHNOLOGY &
MARKETING LAW BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the-third_
wave.htm.
185. See, e.g., David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy", 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1365, 1366 (2002) (noting that "[c]ommunication in cyberspace is not 'functionally identical' to
communication in realspace-at least, not in ways relevant to the application of the choice-of-law
and jurisdictional principles under discussion").
186. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
187. Kenneth Frazier, the president and CEO of Merck & Co. recently wrote that "the life
sciences are largely absent from most discussions about encouraging innovation, while the exten-
sive research and development that stands behind each new vaccine of medicine is invisible to all
but a few. Most Americans have no clue about the extraordinary scientific innovation and huge
R&D investment embodied in the small pill or capsule their doctors prescribe." Kenneth C.
Frazier, Will Washington Find the Cure for Cancer?, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2011, at A 17.
188. Kozinski & Goldfoot, supra note 178, at 371.
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gives online intermediaries an unfair advantage over their offline counterparts.
It also skews society's sense of values and Wall Street's valuation sense.'
89
Facebook may soon have a billion users but it is really more valuable to so-
ciety than a company that is researching a cure for cancer? Given the potential
for rich financial rewards, shouldn't online companies be willing to bear some
of the risks of their business models?
The threat of liability may actually spur some types of innovation by cre-
ating a market need.' 90 Some companies may develop technologies that assist
other companies in minimizing the risk of civil liability. For example, Face-
book recently adopted Microsoft's PhotoDNA technology to detect child por-
nography on its site.' 9' Critics have argued that social networking sites should
do more to prevent predators on their sites from exploiting children. Microsoft
created the product to address a social problem and Facebook adopted the
technology in response to market pressure. 92 Similarly, proprietorship liability
may create a market need that may, in turn, spur innovation as entrepreneurs
create products that enable other companies to reduce the risk of liability.
On the other hand, broad immunity may promote technology that is so-
cially harmful. It may encourage the development of even sneakier ways to
take unauthorized photographs and recordings or it may lower their cost and
make the existing technology accessible to more consumers. There may be less
consideration given to (and thus less effort to prevent) the negative conse-
quences of technological innovations.1 93 As Kozinski and Goldfoot note:
There is an even more fundamental reason why it would be unwise to exempt
the innovators who create the technology that will shape the course of our
lives: granting them that exemption will yield a generation of technology that
will shape the course of our lives: granting them that exemption will yield a
generation of technology that facilitates the behavior that our society has de-
cided to prohibit. If the [I]ntemet is still being developed, then we should do
189. Facebook's recent public offering valued that company at $104 billion. See Shayndi
Raice et al., Facebook Prices IPO at Record Value, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2012), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702303448404577409923406193162.html.
190. A similar point is that imposing tort liability may provide an incentive for intermedi-
aries to implement consumer protective measures. Rustad and Koenig note that an interactive
computer service provider is "in the best position to develop comprehensive authentication sys-
tems to reduce anonymous crimes and torts in cyberspace .... However, absent a change in ISP
law, [they have] no responsibility to lend a hand to consumers who are victimized by online frauds
even if the ISP can readily uncover the wrongdoer's contact information." Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 19, at 391.
191. Emie Allen, Facebook to Use Microsoft's PhotoDNA Technology to Combat Child




193. Patricia Leigh Brown, In Oakland, Redefining Sex Trade Workers as Abuse Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A 13. Brown describes the problem of "American-born minors lured
into the sex trade" as one that has "exploded with the Internet." Id.
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what we can to guide its development in a direction that promotes compli-
ance with the law.
19 4
Facial recognition technologies, for example, have raised privacy concerns
because they are being introduced into consumer goods and on social net-
working sites. 195 The possibilities of combining broad website immunity,
anonymous postings and the two regrettable behaviors are chilling and may
threaten what privacy that we do have-privacy that is already greatly dimin-
ished by technological advancements. Website operators may be more
thoughtful about how and whether to employ such technologies if they lose
their broad immunity.
The burdens of proprietorship liability should not be exaggerated. The
standard is not one of strict liability nor a heightened one, but one of ordinary
reasonableness. It merely permits an inquiry into the reasonableness of a web-
site proprietor's conduct. By that standard, most of our cherished Internet
companies would still be in business as they already strive to conform to so-
cially acceptable business practices and are typically responsive to customer
complaints. Google will continue to thrive; TheDirty.com will not.
Significantly, online entities have ways to reduce the risks of doing busi-
ness and have a way to alleviate the burdens from lawsuits. They can require
their users to indemnify the site from third-party lawsuits arising out of content
posted by the user. They can require visitors (and not just posters) to click to
agree to certain contractual terms, such as mandatory arbitration, forum selec-
tion, and attorneys' fees before accessing the site. 196 The website operator may
also avail itself of one of the proposed safe harbors by permitting content only
by identified posters, responding to takedown requests or organizing itself as a
nonprofit and refusing to accept paid advertisements.
One might argue that revising section 230 immunity is unnecessary be-
cause socially harmful businesses, such as gossip sites, will eventually be
driven out by the invisible hand of the marketplace. This reliance on market
forces, however, ignores the economics of the Internet and the way that section
230 forces any such hand. Web-based businesses generally have much lower
start-up and operating costs than their counterparts in the offline world. For
example, the founder of 4chan, a website created in 2003, which attracts
mostly advertisers in the adult entertainment industry, said that his site gener-
ates advertising revenue in the "low five figures."' 97 Yet, he started the site
when he was only fifteen years old and has been able to keep it running for
nearly a decade. A publisher of books and magazines has much greater costs
194. Kozinski & Goldfoot, supra note 178, at 371.
195. Emily Steel, A Face Launches 1,000 Apps, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,2011, at B5 (noting the
concern that privacy advocates have over how facial recognition technology is used by companies
that employ them).
196. See Kim, supra note 17, at 1014-19 (proposing contractual and design strategies to
deter cyber harassment).
197. Jenna Wortham, Founder of a Provocative Web Site Forms a New Outlet, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2011, at B I. The New York Times reported that 4chan is "one of the largest forums on the
Internet" and considered "one of the darkest comers of the Web." Id.
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than an online publisher of content. Yet, book and magazine publishers are not
immune from liability the way online publishers are under section 230. Section
230 puts an enormous thumb on the scale that typically weighs free market
forces, tilting the balance in favor of online companies.
The invisible hand argument also ignores the multiplicity of ways that
websites can generate monetary gain for their operators. Even if the websites
themselves do not generate much revenue, the proprietors of these websites
reap the benefits of high visibility and can receive book contracts, speaking
invitations and offers to invest in future online ventures.
1 98
More importantly, the invisible hand argument ignores the realities of
online harm. Even if the invisible hand eventually drives some sites out of
business, the content that was posted while they existed may remain search-
able and accessible online. The "invisible hand" argument too easily dismisses
the very real harm to the victims of these businesses. For victims of online
harassment, any website that enabled the ruination of their lives was in busi-
ness too long.
199
B. Section 230 and Free Speech
A common protest raised whenever the issue of amending section 230
arises is that anything other than broad immunity would chill speech.2° Yet,201
First Amendment doctrine recognizes limits on speech. The salient issue is
not whether limits to online speech should exist, but what those limits should
be. As Cass Sunstein notes:
New technologies have greatly expanded the opportunity to communicate ob-
scene, libelous, violent, or harassing messages .... Invasions of privacy are
198. The founder of 4chan, for example, launched a career as public speaker, an investment
fund adviser, and founder of a new, venture-backed website. Id.
199. See Lipton, We the Paparazzi, supra note 10, at 983 (noting that privacy invading
digital recordings may have "serious long-term consequences for many people").
200. Danielle Keats Citron observes that limiting abusive online communications may
protect First Amendment values such as democratic governance. Citron, supra note 3, at 101-03.
Cass Sunstein notes that the goals of the First Amendment are "closely connected with the
founding commitment to a particular kind of polity: a deliberative democracy among informed
citizens who are political equals." Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE
L.J. 1757, 1800 (1995). He cautions that "[flree speech doctrine, with its proliferating tests, dis-
tinctions, and subparts, should not lose touch" with the purposes of the First Amendment and that
"instead of allowing new technologies to use democratic processes for their own purposes, con-
stitutional law should be concerned with harnessing those technologies for democratic ends-
including the founding aspirations to public deliberation, citizenship, political equality, and even a
certain kind of virtue." Id.
201. See Citron, supra note 3, at 106-10 (explaining how First Amendment doctrine does
not protect threats, defamatory statements and emotional distress claims). See, e.g., In re Verizon
Internet Services, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246 (D.D.C. 2003). The Recording Industry
Association of America sought the identity of an anonymous user of Verizon's service who is
alleged to have infringed copyrights by offering hundreds of songs for downloading. The court
stated, "But when the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects anonymity, it has
typically done so in cases involving core First Amendment expression.... The DMCA ... does
not directly impact core political speech, and thus may not warrant the type of 'exacting scrutiny'
reserved for that context." Id. at 259-60.
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far more likely. The Internet poses special problems on these counts. As a
general rule, any restrictions should be treated like those governing ordinary
speech, with ordinary mail providing the best analogy. If restrictions are nar-
rowly tailored, and supported by a sufficiently strong record, they should be
upheld.
20 2
But rather than recognizing the unique character of harms caused by
online speech, the broad immunity of section 230 as (erroneously) applied by
many courts ignores them, and then loosens offline speech restrictions. The
First Amendment doctrine that has been crafted by the judiciary over the years
to carefully balance free speech with societal harms has been jettisoned by
section 230. Offline publishers have never been granted blanket immunity
from liability for the works they publish. Even online, intermediaries are liable
for copyright infringement where they fail to remove claimed copyrighted
works after notice. 20 3 The argument in favor of website proprietorship liability
is not one that favors a new law-rather, it favors a return to the law, and the
standard of reasonableness, that governs the rest of our society. 204 It rejects the
Internet exceptionalism that favors different rules and laws, or no law, for
online conduct. 2°5 Print publishers and distributors are, to varying degrees,
subject to liability for the content they publish and distribute. No offline pub-
lisher has broad immunity akin to that enjoyed by its online counterpart. Not
only do web publishers enjoy the lower costs of publication and distribution,
they also are freed from many of the oversight and control responsibilities
required of nondigital publishers. 206 The vetting of content routinely under-
taken by nondigital publishers, which results in more accurate, better written
202. Sunstein, supra note 200, at 1799.
203. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§512,
1201-05, 1301-22 and 24 U.S.C. §4001) (2006) (making it unlawful to access a work protected
by an antipiracy measure but contains a notice and takedown provision for ISPs).
204. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers
of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (2000) (noting the danger of
"endowing the new challenges in cyberspace with such novelty that it becomes too easy to forget
that the underlying problems have been with us for a very long time.") Cf Lyrissa Lidsky, Hit
Lists: Cyber Incitement, Cyber Threats, PRAWFsBLAWG (Apr. 8. 2011), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/hit-lists-is-cyber-incitement-different.html (wondering whether
the Internet is a game changer for First Amendment doctrine).
205. Epstein, supra note 204, at 1006. Epstein also notes the problems created by what he
calls "'First Amendment exceptionalism,' that is the belief that the First Amendment weights the
scales above and beyond what a sensible theory of freedom of speech, understood as part of a
general theory of freedom, would require." Id.
206. As Richard Epstein notes:
One recent question of some import concerns the liability of Internet operators for defamatory mes-
sages posted on their systems by others. The Communications Decency Act provides these web
page operators with absolute immunity. The obvious points here are, first, that the plaintiffs pre-
ferred defamation action should be directed against the party who posted the message, assuming
that she can find him; next, that it becomes virtually impossible to ask the proprietor of the network
to maintain a constant surveillance of the content posted on various sites by the wide range of sub-
scribers, some of whom are certain to hold extreme, malevolent, or outlandish views. But that said,
how different is the problem here from an attempt to hold a newspaper responsible for the content
of personal advertisements, or a lending library responsible for the contents of the books it sends
into circulation or a broadcast station for the defamation of one of its guests?
Id. at 1005 (citation omitted).
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content, is often absent from the sites of publishers that encourage the two
regrettable behaviors. A reasonableness standard conforms to societal expec-
tations of businesses while permitting adjustments to the way the law is ap-
plied where the online experience really is different from the offline one.
This article's proposals promote the values of free expression. Some free
speech advocates may be concerned that two of the proposed safe harbors
reduce the number of forums for anonymous speech. This is only an illusory
concern as the reality is that truly anonymous online speech does not really
exist anymore even if unveiling a poster may be difficult. True anonymity has
already been eradicated by the greed of online intermediaries who are intent on
making money through increasingly more privacy, invasive technology. This
technology can be used against posters, to strip them of their anonymity, under
court order. In a sense then, this article's proposed Takedown Upon Notice-
Right of Reply Poster Identification safe harbor provides a greater benefit to
posters than the section 230 regime that currently exists. It gives posters the
chance to reconsider and have removed a potentially defamatory post, one
which may have been made in a hot-tempered emotional state. The poster may
ultimately decide to stand by the post but then does so with the awareness that
a lawsuit may ensue. The current regime of absolute immunity provides post-
ers with a false sense of security, with many unaware that their veil of ano-
nymity may be shredded in the event of litigation. It also gives them control
over whether the post should continue to be published, unlike the current 230
regime that gives intermediaries sole control over content with no liability for
their actions.
Often, the free speech argument is framed in terms of hard core libertari-
anism yet conveniently forgets that immunity was granted by government
intervention. Rather than proposing new legislation or regulation, this article
seeks to remedy the negative effects of existing legislation. Scaling back the
scope of the CDA is actually a move against regulation because it is the exist-
ence of this regulation that is a major contributing problem to socially harmful
behavior online. Whereas offline publishers and distributors bear some respon-
sibility for the works they publish, online publishers have broad immunity,
which may encourage them to act in a socially irresponsible manner. Without
the broad blanket immunity that section 230 provides, many of the most so-
cially harmful websites would not survive, or they would have to redesign
their websites in a way that forces greater accountability from their users.
C. Same Side of the Fence Criticisms
Some "same side of the fence" arguments may be expected from those
who agree that limits should be placed on section 230 immunity, but believe
that my proposals do not go far enough or object to some or all of the proposed
safe harbors. As previously noted, other scholars have made stronger proposals
for a notice-and-take-down regime similar to that currently applicable under
the DMCA.2 °7 Although such a regime is appealing for a variety of reasons,
207. See discussion supra Part tI.B.
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given the volume of postings on many websites and the difficulty of deter-
mining their lawfulness without a factual inquiry, a notice-and-take-down
regime may leave some website operators unduly burdened. Accordingly, my
proposals include safe harbors in addition to notice and takedown.
Admittedly, the proposals in this article will not prevent every type of
online harm and should not be expected to do so. What they do is carefully
balance the harms of online postings and the two regrettable behaviors against
legitimate concerns raised by those who desire the retention of immunity. In
this way, I hope to move the conversation regarding section 230 immunity
"over the fence."
Some may argue that to accommodate Internet growth and innovation, we
should relinquish norms, such as privacy, and succumb to the changes that the
Internet brings. But this view is outdated, stuck in time circa the early 1990s.
The Internet is no longer a niche medium used by a handful of tech savvy
individuals and it should not be treated as such. What happens online does not
stay online; it affects human lives and our society's norms of conduct and
communication.2 °8 The Internet exceptionalist argument ignores that not all
change is good or inevitable. The path forged by the most trollish Internet
users and the free for all nature of discourse is not predetermined or immu-
table. Change is organic and can be shaped and molded. Law is one way to
shape change, and section 230 has shaped online discourse in a very negative
way.
Critics of my proposed legislative amendment may object that the pro-
spect of liability means that website operators would be required to make dif-
ficult subjective decisions about the legality and legitimacy of certain postings.
A website operator might overreact and remove even constitutionally permis-
sible content in response to takedown requests, thereby chilling speech. Thus,
the argument goes, to avoid sliding down the slippery slope toward censorship,
law and policy makers should leave the Internet to regulate itself.
Contrary to what this argument suggests, a takedown request is not "Big
Brother" censoring what a private citizen can reveal about oneself, but an
individual's attempt to protect her privacy and right to expression against the
intrusive or unwanted actions of another private citizen.
208. Elias Aboujaoude has written about the ways that the online identifies of individuals
has irrevocably damaged their offline selves. See generally ELIAS ABOUJADOUDE, VIRTUALLY
You: THE DANGEROUS POWERS OF THE E-PERSONALITY (2011). He notes, for example, that
"[tihe way we see and evaluate ourselves is changing as a function of new personality traits born
and nurtured in the virtual world." Id. at 10.
209. See SOLOVE, supra note 18, at vii (noting that "[w]hen it comes to gossip and rumor on
the Internet ... the culprit is ourselves. We're invading each other's privacy and we're also in-
vading our own privacy by exposures of information we later come to regret. Individual rights are
implicated on both sides of the equation. Protecting privacy can come into tension with safe-
guarding free speech...").
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Furthermore, there is another slippery slope that is too often left unmen-
tioned. As uncivil discourse increases, it threatens to weaken the girding that
enables speech and expression. An example can be found in the tragic example
involving a Rutgers student, Tyler Clementi.21 ° Clementi committed suicide
after his roommate, Dharun Ravi surreptitiously recorded Clementi having a
sexual encounter with another man in his dorm room and then posted it online.
What Ravi exposed by his treacherous act was a very private side of Clementi
that the latter did not wish to share with just anyone, much less with everyone.
Not only had Ravi invaded Clementi's privacy, he wrested away his room-
mate's autonomy, taking from him control over a very fundamental and per-
sonal part of his life. As Sean Scott writes: "Allowing the right to privacy to
preempt the First Amendment may not be as harmful to First Amendment
values as has been suggested by some courts. Indeed, recognizing the privacy
interest at stake allows us to retain our autonomy, our dignity and facilitates
this experiment called democracy. 21'
The schism between online and offline realities is a mirage and Clementi
was not the only one who was hurt by the two regrettable online behaviors.
Friends of the perpetrators, expressed surprise that Ravi would have engaged
in such conduct.212 Ravi's act of recording Clementi in an intimate moment,
without his permission, was a level of intrusion that was unthinkable and diffi-
cult to accomplish twenty years ago but which is now too easy to do. Ravi's
offline demeanor reportedly did not correspond to his online one, which sug-
gests an extreme disinhibition effect. Clementi, however, did not have the
advantage of a different online "persona" to shield him from the public's glare.
But neither did Ravi as his identity was soon revealed on the Internet and na-
tional newspapers, and he became the object of universal scorn. Ravi was
ultimately convicted of invasion of privacy and bias intimidation, which is a
hate crime.213 He could have served up to ten years for his impulsive third-
214party post but served 20 days of a 30-day jail sentence.
There are those who argue that rather than thinking of ways to punish and
deter those like Ravi, we should "toughen up" those like Clementi. That pre-
sents the other, more dangerous, slippery slope. A failure to enforce minimal
levels of civility opens up the very real danger of tumbling headlong into a
society that sanctions bullying of its disempowered and its marginalized. Then,
rather than tolerance and justice, treachery and abuse become societal norms.
Danielle Keats Citron writes about the pernicious effects of trivializing the
210. Times Topics: Tyler Clementi, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/referencel
tlmestopics/people/c/tyler__clementiindex.htmI (last updated Mar. 26, 2012).
211. Scott, supra note 9, at 744.
212. Amy Ellis Nutt, Friends of Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei Support Pair Charged in
Rutgers Sex Video Case, RUTGERS STAR LEDGER (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/index.
ssf/2010/10/friends of dharun ravi-molly-w.htmi.
213. Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2012, at Al.
214. Id.; Kate Zernike, Jail Term Ends After 20 Days for a Former Rutgers Student, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A26.
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harmful effects of cyber harassment and argues that "[b]ecause law is expres-
sive, it constructs our understanding of harms that are not trivial. 21 5
Without a minimal level of security, citizens no longer feel free to express
themselves, in public spaces or in the privacy of their own homes. Their ina-
bility to control the distribution of their expressive activity-who gets to see
them do what and with whom-diminishes their very right to expression. Ex-
pression then becomes the privilege of those who are socially untouchable,
because of their wealth or power, or because their expression is considered
within acceptable social norms. As Jacqueline Lipton writes in the context of
digital video invasions of privacy,
If we do not act now, privacy-destroying norms may become entrenched and
it will be much more difficult to protect privacy in the future .... There is lit-
tle downside to considering regulatory action to protect privacy. Regulation,
imperfect as it may be, can be revised later, but today's video privacy incur-
sions may have far-reaching and potentially devastating consequences.
216
My proposals strive to recapture the autonomy that has been lost in recent
years and aim to loosen the grip that the two regrettable online behaviors have
on our culture.
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215. Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REv. 373, 377 (2009) (referring to the law's ability to recognize the
distinct suffering of online gender harassment).
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